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ABSTRACT 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the efforts of the nation’s military 
toward inter-state strategic competition and away from counter-terrorism. The shift in 
strategic focus away from what has been the staple of the U.S. Army regimen for the past 
18 years requires new doctrine to address near-peer adversaries. Analysis is necessary to 
assess the future roles and capabilities of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC) when conducting operations to support the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) 
concept during armed conflict. This study reviews key aspects of the emerging MDO 
concept and core tasks of Special Forces, and analyzes four historical case studies of 
special operations personnel operating within a non-permissive environment. Through 
common observations of special operations missions over time, this study derives ten 
themes across the U.S. Army’s warfighting functions that increase the efficiency of 
Special Forces within non-permissive environments. Key among the themes is that air 
power alone is insufficient to achieve operational objectives and Special Forces are 
required to facilitate the destruction of high-priority targets or conduct reconnaissance to 
answer priority information requirements. As history has shown us, Special Forces teams 
will continue to be employed for a variety of reconnaissance, surveillance, sabotage, and 
direct-action missions within the MDO environment inside of denied areas to achieve 
operational and strategic objectives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the heels of threats and posturing between the United States and the government 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
redirected the efforts of the nation’s military by stating, “Inter-state strategic competition, 
not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 With this shift in our 
strategic focus of military training efforts and budgets away from terrorism-centric tasks 
that had been the staple of the U.S. Army regimen for the past 18 years, a new doctrine to 
address a near-peer enemy, needed to be created. The result is the concept being put forth 
in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028.2 As a 
result of the new priority on potential conflict between nation states and the reduced focus 
against violent extremist organizations requires the U.S. Army Special Forces to review 
their current doctrine and roles.  
Throughout history U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) have been called upon to 
conduct high-risk operations to mitigate the capability gap in conventional forces. SF have 
historically been required to conduct operations in hostile, denied or politically sensitive 
environments to enable targeting, and intelligence collection, and to conduct sabotage 
operations deemed inappropriate to assign to conventional forces. The future operating 
environment will impose a high demand for SF due to advanced technologies of U.S. 
adversaries that neutralize our technological advantage on the battlefield.3 Airpower alone 
will no longer be sufficient to achieve operational objectives of either the destruction of 
high-priority targets or reconnaissance operations required to answer strategic information 
requirements. U.S. Army SF must reassess its current capabilities and reprioritize core 
                                                 
1 Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” Real 
Clear Defense, January 20, 2018, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/01/20/
summary_of_the_2018_national_defense_strategy_112929.html. 
2 TRADOC, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army 
TRADOC, 2018). 
3 TRADOC, v–xii, A1, B1–2. 
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tasks to ensure effectiveness in the future operating environment as envisioned by the new 
MDO doctrine.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
Having reprioritized training and doctrine away from traditional warfighting tasks 
and in light of technological change, the SF community must renew its focus on 
competition and conflict between modern military powers to fulfill the obligation of the 
force conceptualized by the multi-domain operations (MDO). An analysis of lessons 
learned from previous conflicts could suggest what functional changes need to be 
implemented in order to prepare our special operations soldiers to succeed. The shift in 
focus from violent extremist organizations to inter-state competition is what makes MDO 
important and timely, as it will provide the training emphasis and employment of Special 
Forces soldiers for years to come.  
Having focused on the Global War on Terror since 2001, SF soldiers have enjoyed 
every benefit of technology and airpower to aid them during close combat. The Global War 
on Terror has undoubtedly sharpened certain skillsets of Army Special Forces, but has also 
created a force that has become accustomed to operating from large static forward 
operating bases supported with the latest technology and unchallenged airpower. The 
future operating environment  of Multi-Domain Operations envisions a battlefield where 
the United States’ technological advantage and air power are heavily contested if not 
denied outright.4 Army SF will require a shift in doctrine, organization, training and 
leadership in order to successfully conduct operations in the deep maneuver and the 
operational deep fires maneuver areas within MDO.  
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
How can U.S. Army Special Forces, prepare for conflict in the deep maneuver and 
operational deep fires areas of the MDO concept? What historical observations can be 
applied to enable U.S. Army Special Forces to prepare for this potentiality? 
                                                 
4 TRADOC, v–xii, A1, B1–2. 
3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
The previous decades of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced 
a status quo for U.S. Forces from a position of relative technological and firepower 
superiority. During a future conflict, as depicted in the MDO concept, the U.S. military’s 
freedom of action will be contested by layered standoff weapons and denied airspace.5 
While the current trend of limited and proxy wars may continue to require the use of Special 
Forces, it is critical to understand how and where SF will be asked to operate in the MDO 
future operational environment. 
D. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze selected historical cases from successes 
and failures of special operations conducted in non-permissive environments that may 
apply to MDO’s deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas. Our objective is to 
suggest guidelines for redeveloping atrophied SF capabilities following 18 years of a focus 
on counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare. 
This research examines four historical cases in which special operations forces 
conducted operations in non-permissive areas similar to the battlespace identified in the 
MDO concept’s deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas. The case studies range 
from the actions conducted during World War II to present day. The cases range a span of 
time in which military forces adapted in order to apply technologies and tactics to 
overcome a variety of adversarial capabilities. It assumes that the future MDO environment 
may face similar challenges as in the past due to peer adversaries’ technology negating 
previously observed U.S. technological advantages.  
The U.S. Army’s newly theorized MDO concept serves as the motivator for this 
study, insofar as it anticipates how SF will conduct future warfare against peer state 
adversaries. Published in November 2018, it provides the latest sanctioned insight into how 
the U.S. Army will need to train, organize, and equip the force for the next decade or longer. 
Our research analyzes prior special operations in the context of the warfighting functions 
                                                 
5 TRADOC, 6,15. 
4 
and suggests how to approach the MDO concept to recommend how the Army might 
prepare for the employment of SOF within the deep maneuver and operational deep fires 
areas. In essence, MDO directs USASOC to maintain irregular warfare skills and to employ 
those specialties in the spectrum of conflict short of war while simultaneously adapting 
future Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) to conduct core missions in the deep 
maneuver and operational deep fires areas of the future.6  
This study assumes that SF will continue to conduct the full spectrum of its core 
tasks but is scoped to look specifically at the role Green Berets may be called upon to 
conduct within the MDO concept as a member of the Joint Force during armed conflict. 
Specifically, the competition phase of MDO, prior to armed conflict, was not explored as 
SF’s role is not a significant departure from current activities. 
  
                                                 
6 USASOC, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Role in the Deep Fires Area (Fort Bragg, NC: 
USASOC, 2019). 
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we review key aspects of current USASOC doctrine, the emerging 
MDO concept, the war fighting functions, Special Forces core tasks, and the case studies 
selected to derive patterns of successful and unsuccessful adaptations of Special Operations 
Forces (SOF).  
A. MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS  
United States Army Special SF have been required to conduct ground operations 
well beyond the forward line of troops (FLOT) since their inception. However, the reason 
for an emphasis on this particular area in our research is due to the lack of operational 
experience that ARSOF has experienced since the 1991 Gulf War. Multi-Domain 
Operations describes an ambiguous geographical space into several distinct zones based 
on enemy reach and capabilities. The U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept uses 
the Russian military as the pacing threat for the benchmark of technology and doctrinal 
strategies to meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy and the 
National Defense Strategy.7 Through analysis of strategic threats to the U.S. military, 
MDO attempts to address the problem of layered standoff that strategic competitors are 
capable of creating through the synergy of land, sea, air, space, and cyber capabilities.8  
The purpose of TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain 
Operations 2028, is to describe how the U.S. Army will contribute to the Joint Force’s task 
to deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict as 
directed in the National Defense Strategy.9 Ideally, adversaries are outpaced and 
outmaneuvered in the competition phase of multi-domain operations prior to the onset of 
armed conflict. Army Special Forces have a highly valuable and unique role in the 
competition phase of MDO. However, USASOC must equally be prepared to integrate into 
                                                 
7 TRADOC, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, vi, 7. 
8 TRADOC, iii,vi,7. 
9 TRADOC, vi. 
6 
the joint force as the conflict progresses into armed conflict when required.10 In the event 
of armed conflict, U.S. Special Forces will be called upon as part of the Joint Force to 
penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems.11  
The 2018 MDO draft attempts to provide a conceptual framework that accounts for 
activities in space and time.12 The proposed doctrine frames the MDO battlefield geometry 
by operational context, friendly and enemy capabilities, and terrain (Figure 1).13 Each area 
in the MDO framework consists of both friendly and enemy capabilities.14 The increase in 
battlefield areas, expanded geographic terrain, and conceptual time horizons reflect new 
updates in proposed MDO doctrine.15 The MDO framework, from left to right, begins with 
the support areas (Figure 1). Together, the strategic, operational and tactical support areas 
is the “space in which the Joint Force seeks to retain, maximum freedom of action, speed, 
and agility to counter the enemy’s multi-domain efforts to attack friendly forces.”16 The 
Close Area is the region in which friendly forces make physical contact with the adversary 
to achieve overall campaign objectives.17 Commanders employ capabilities in the Close 
Area to synchronize the effects of combined arms maneuver to defeat the enemy.18 
                                                 
10 TRADOC, viii. 
11 TRADOC, viii. 
12 TRADOC, 8. 
13 TRADOC, 8. 
14 TRADOC, C2. 
15 TRADOC, C2. 
16 TRADOC, C3. 
17 TRADOC, C3. 
18 TRADOC, C3. 
7 
 
Figure 1. MDO Framework19 
The Deep Maneuver Area is a highly contested area of the battlefield in which 
operations may be conducted, but often require significant planning and support.20 It is 
expected that ground forces will have the capability to conduct operations for longer 
periods of time in the deep maneuver area compared to the operational and strategic deep 
fires areas.21 The deep maneuver area has greater potential for commanders to synchronize 
movement and maneuver and fires to achieve operational level objectives compared to the 
operational and strategic deep fires areas.22 The MDO Framework is conveying the level 
in which the area is denied, contested, and more restricted by the adversary the further to 
the right of the depicted battlefield geometry (Figure 1). While the figure does indicate 
                                                 
19 Adapted from TRADOC, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. 
20 TRADOC, C3. 
21 TRADOC, C3. 
22 TRADOC, C3. 
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potential depths of the battlefield in kilometers, the space is not rigidly delineated or set to 
scale. The MDO battlespace could be significantly smaller or larger and is not 
geographically defined but is more dependent upon friendly and adversarial capabilities to 
define operational zones.23   
The deep fires areas, consisting of the operational and strategic deep fires areas, are 
the space in which movement for conventional forces is no longer feasible.24 The MDO 
recognizes these areas as the space in which Special Operations Forces, joint fires, cyber, 
and information operations may be employed to gain advantages over the adversary.25 
These areas are either “too far for conventional maneuver forces to enter or they are 
prohibited by policy.”26 The limitations imposed and difference between the operational 
and strategic deep fires are primarily distinguished between current laws, policy and 
authorities.27 
The 2018 MDO draft document places emphasis on special operations forces 
operating in the deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas (Figure 1).28 The 
theoretical deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas are historically an appropriate 
region within the battlefield geometry for SF to conduct operations to achieve effects at the 
operational and strategic level. However, a conflict with a peer state competitor in a multi-
domain environment would be a distinct departure from the manner of operations which 
the U.S. military and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) have been conducting 
counter-terrorism operations for almost two decades.  
The proposed MDO concept also suggests that SOF may conduct operations in the 
“Close Area.”29 Special operations conducted in the close area would most likely consist 
                                                 
23 TRADOC, C–2. 
24 TRADOC, C2. 
25 TRADOC, C2. 
26 TRADOC, C2. 
27 TRADOC, C2–3. 
28 TRADOC, 8, C2–4. 
29 TRADOC, 27, 32. 
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of special reconnaissance to enable joint fires targeting. This brings the potential for the 
inefficient employment of SF at the tactical level to employ tactical fires. The U.S. Army 
maintained a dedicated Long Range Surveillance (LRS) capability, but it was disbanded in 
2017 due to risk aversion and the advent of advanced Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance aerial platforms.30 The deactivation of the Army’s only light surveillance 
capability may have left a gap in intelligence collection and the employment of indirect 
fires. A potential solution to fill the gap would be to utilize Special Forces to conduct 
reconnaissance to enable brigade fires. We opine that the employment of SF to achieve 
tactical effects would be an inappropriate and inefficient solution to fill the potential gap 
in conventional military formations as it would risk operational to strategic level assets for 
tactical level gains.31  
As the Army attempts to reframe the environment in which future conflicts will 
occur, USASOC must reassess its current core competencies and capabilities to identify 
gaps between current and future MDO requirements. United States Army Special 
Operations Command seeks to develop competitive ARSOF formations that will provide a 
competitive advantage as irregular warfare experts.32 USASOC recognizes that it must 
continue to master the basics in order to operate in austere denied areas where technology 
no longer exists.33 In the deep maneuver and operational deep fires area, SOF will be 
required to operate with partner nation forces or unilaterally, to delay adversary movement, 
disrupt anti-access area denial systems, and create complex dilemmas for our 
adversaries.34   
                                                 
30 Josh Tawson, “Fixing the Army’s Deep Reconnaissance Problem: Rebuild It’s Long-Range 
Surveillance Capabilities,” Mountain Tactical Institute, February 22, 2019, https://mtntactical.com/
knowledge/fixing-the-armys-deep-reconnaissance-problem-rebuild-its-long-range-surveillance-
capabilities/. 
31 Department of the Army, FM 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 2010), 1–13. 
32 USASOC, USASOC Army Special Operations Forces Strategy (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2019), 
4. 
33 USASOC, 3. 
34 USASOC, 3. 
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The Army defines an MDO environment in which we are contested in all domains 
by an increasingly lethal adversary and where deterrence is challenged through the use of 
complex and layered long range weapon systems.35 We must assume that, adversaries’ 
technology will negate the previously experienced U.S. technological advantages.36 Army 
SOF must adapt and overcome the anticipated loss of our longstanding advantages in 
technology due to the advances of area denial systems by adversarial state actors. Perhaps, 
we need to be prepared to revert to old tactics and techniques thought to be outdated in 
order to conduct operations in a highly contested and denied environment. USASOC will 
have to adapt new ways to gain advantage over our adversaries in the battlespace. “U.S. 
military dominance is not assured.”37 Proxy warfare is expanding to include influence from 
all domains to create a more complex battlefield while maintaining a threshold of violence 
below the level of armed conflict between larger near-peer states.38 Specifically, Russia 
and China are exploiting these trends to challenge regional areas of weaker U.S. 
influence.39 As the Army innovates to counter new threats and increasingly complex 
environments, USASOC must self-assess to maintain existing capabilities and eliminate 
gaps in capabilities to complement conventional forces. 
B. U.S. MILITARY SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
The United States Army doctrine recognizes the importance to synchronize SOF 
with conventional forces (CF) to achieve synergistic effects against an adversary 
throughout all phases of conflict and in every domain.40 However, historically Army 
doctrine tends to gloss over the specific roles in which to employ the capabilities of SOF. 
                                                 
35 TRADOC, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, v–xii, 6. 
36 TRADOC, 12. 
37 TRADOC, vi. 
38 TRADOC, vi. 
39 TRADOC, vi. 
40 Department of the Army, ADP 3–0 Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2011); Department of the Army, FM 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces; Department of the 
Army, FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001); 
USSOCOM, SOCOM 2035: Commander’s Strategic Guidance (MacDill AFB, FL: USSOCOM, 2016); 
TRADOC, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028; USASOC, USASOC Campaign Plan 2035 
(Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2017). 
11 
The integration of SF and CF has typically been conducted at the special operations task 
force level, but is currently being emphasized and trained at the company level at Army 
national training centers. Since the start of the Global War on Terror, Special Forces 
Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODA) have been employed in support of conventional 
maneuver brigades conducting tactical reconnaissance in support of conventional brigade 
fires.  
While the integration of SF at the tactical level may be considered necessary, we 
suggest that it can lead to ineffective employment of SF units if capabilities are 
misprioritized. This is especially true if command relationships are not clearly defined. Due 
to the operational and strategic nature of SF missions, there are no clear tactics, techniques 
and procedures to integrate SF/CF missions at the tactical level. Without clear doctrinal 
guidance on SF/CF integration, commanders rely on prior experience, warfighter exercises, 
and national training centers. Conceptually, USASOC understands it must remain agile and 
adaptive, but where in time and space will SF best be employed in MDO? Clarity on how 
conventional and Special Operations Forces will integrate in the future battlespace will be 
vital and a lack of clarity appears to persist in the new U.S. Army in MDO 2028.41 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CORE TASKS  
USASOC provides a unique capability to wage irregular warfare against an 
adversary to gain distinct operational and strategic advantages. The conduct of Irregular 
warfare (IW) is a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant population(s).”42 United States SOF ensures the capability to 
conduct IW by maintaining competency in nine core tasks (see Figure 2).43 For the 
purposes of this study “Special Reconnaissance,” “Direct Action,” and “Unconventional 
Warfare” receive select focus as they are the most commonly and likely to be conducted 
tasks by SF in an MDO environment. 
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Figure 2. Special Operations Core Activities44 
1. Special Reconnaissance 
Special reconnaissance (SR) is the “reconnaissance and surveillance actions 
conducted in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance.”45 The political sensitivity and the 
significance of the information collected is what sets special reconnaissance apart from 
conventional reconnaissance operations. Special Operations Forces conduct SR to collect 
information that will achieve operational or strategic effects. In certain cases, it may be 
appropriate to utilize SOF to conduct special reconnaissance on lower tactical level targets 
if the risk merits it. Historically, SR conducted in an environment with high levels of 
political risk have been cross-border operations in an undeclared combat zone. In the MDO 
future operating environment, SF will be called upon to conduct SR in order to see, sense, 
and fight.46 SF will be required to collect operational knowledge and provide actionable 
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intelligence to the Joint Force.47 Combined with direct action objectives that a SR team 
may be called upon to conduct, such as sabotage, this core task is emphasized to a greater 
degree within this study as it represents a high degree of risk to SF soldiers and is the 
traditional role conventional Army leadership imparts upon SOF during high intensity 
conflict.48 
2. Direct Action  
Direct actions consist of “short duration strikes conducted in hostile, denied or 
politically sensitive environments to seize, capture, exploit, or destroy” a specific target.49 
Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions due to the level of physical or 
political risk and the degree of precision required to achieve the desired end-state.50 SOF 
may also conduct raids, ambushes, sabotage, and enable precision guided munitions.51 
Typically, direct action missions conducted by SF are short duration, often time sensitive, 
and include a planned withdrawal.52 Direct action operations could be conducted 
unilaterally, combined with a partner force or enabled through surrogate forces. In the 
future MDO environment SOF will be expected to penetrate and disrupt adversary systems 
in the deep fires area through time sensitive targeting, precision strikes and subversion.53 
SOF will leverage long range precision fires in the Operational Deep Fires Area to conduct 
time sensitive and precision targeting of high priority targets.54  
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3. Unconventional Warfare  
Unconventional warfare (UW) is defined as “activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or 
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla 
force in a denied area.”55 SF may train partner forces sympathetic to U.S. interests to cause 
issues and create dilemmas in an adversary’s rear echelon to detract from their overall 
ability to mass combat power. The costs, risk and long-term third order effects of using 
UW must be carefully considered before employment.56 When UW is properly integrated 
and synchronized with overarching joint operations, UW can provide options to gain space, 
time, and leverage over an adversary. SOF’s ability to prepare the future environment exists 
in phase zero or the competition phase, prior to onset of armed conflict.57 Network 
development, partner development and infrastructure analysis requires time.58 SOF has the 
capability to provide strategic options to senior military leaders and policy makers if 
afforded the opportunity to develop relationships and networks prior to the onset of 
hostilities.  
D. MILITARY WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS  
This study organizes and bins observations into the U.S. Army’s Warfighting 
Functions. A warfighting function “is a group of tasks and systems united by a common 
purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives”.59 The use 
of warfighting functions allows this study to coalesce information into generalizable groups 
that aid in the understanding of how historical combat power was applied and under what 
categories observations can be applied to the future operating environment. 
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1. Command and Control 
The command and control warfighting consists of the “tasks required to enable 
commanders to synchronize and converge all of the elements of combat power”.60 The 
purpose of command and control is to “integrate all of the war fighting functions to achieve 
maximum combat power.”61 The coordination and synchronization of combat operations 
requires a balance between the “art of command and the science of control.”62 The 
commander must drive operations by visualizing, describing, directing, leading and then 
assessing operations.63 However, the commander must develop a knowledgeable and 
comprehensive team of staff with joint, interagency and multinational partners.64 In this 
concept the commander exercises the art of command and the staff manages the control. 
Within Army Special Operations, operations are typically bottom up driven. Senior leaders 
provide vision, purpose and a desired end-state for a specific problem. The SF Detachment 
Commanders then plan and execute operations to achieve their senior leaders’ vision and 
end-state.  
2. Movement and Maneuver 
Movement is how a force is arrayed on the battlefield and maneuver is how a force 
relocated to gain distinct advantages over an adversary.65 It consists of all “the tasks 
pertinent to understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and the overall 
operational environment.”66 Army maneuver doctrine stresses it is “imperative forces must 
establish direct and indirect fires to facilitate maneuver on an adversary”.67 Commanders 
manage their forces to ensure they are committed where and when necessary to gain a 
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tactical advantage.68 “Commanders maneuver forces to mass in order to gain surprise and 
momentum”.69 Special Forces Detachment Commanders operate in very small elements 
that require extreme caution when exposing forces to the adversary. Special Forces use 
detailed planning and partner forces to gain a marked advantage over the adversary. 
3. Intelligence 
The intelligence warfighting function “is all the inherent tasks and systems that 
must be coordinated and synchronized to enable an understanding the enemy, terrain, and 
civil considerations within a given operational environment”.70 Intelligence operations 
“requires the synchronization of collection requirements and collection assets with the 
execution of reconnaissance and surveillance operations”.71 The combined nature of most 
special operations, lends SF Detachments the ability to leverage host nation populations 
and partner forces to create a robust intelligence network. 
4. Fires 
Fires is the “tasks and systems that enable coordinated use of Army direct and 
indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the joint operational targeting 
process.”72 Fires includes “surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, surface-to-air and 
cyberspace operations including cyber warfare.”73 Fires enable maneuver and allow 
commanders to create an advantage over the adversary. Army direct and indirect fires “can 
be defensive or offensive to deliver lethal and non-lethal effects on the enemy.”74 Joint 
fires enable small SF Detachments to conduct operations that would otherwise be denied 
due to adversarial control over the operating environment. Leveraging fires enables SF 
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Detachment Commanders to gain time and space to conduct operations in otherwise denied 
environments.  
5. Sustainment 
The sustainment warfighting function comprises “tasks and systems that provide 
support and services to ensure ground forces have freedom of maneuver within an 
operational environment.”75 Sustainment consists of all logistical requirements of a 
maneuver force to include food, fuel, shelter, ammunition and medical supplies. 
Sustainment enables forces to extend operational reach, increase operational duration and 
exploit adversaries.76 Sustainment determines the distance and time Army operations are 
capable of conducting.77 The relatively small size of USASOC formations enables greater 
flexibility when planning for sustainment. Special Forces detachments are trained to 
procure sustainment from the host nation population or partner force when feasible. 
6. Protection 
The protection warfighting function is “the related tasks that preserve friendly 
forces to enable the commander to apply maximum combat power against an adversary”.78 
Protection for special operations include active and passive measures to safeguard friendly 
forces to include operational security measures, physical infrastructure, digital lines of 
communication, and risk mitigation. “Preservation of the force includes personnel and 
physical assets of both military and civilian nature and all multinational partners.”79 
E. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE 
We examined four historical cases in which SOF conducted operations in an area 
controlled by the enemy and deemed impermissible for conventional forces to operate. The 
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case studies range from actions conducted during World War II to Operation Desert Storm. 
The technology available varied drastically between case studies, but technology alone did 
not determine success or failure of the operations. The cases address circumstances or 
situations in which military forces were required to adapt in order to apply new tactics to 
overcome an adversary. The MDO concept asserts that the U.S. military may face similar 
challenges as in select past conflicts due to peer adversaries’ technology negating U.S. 
technological advantages. We anticipate the United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC) may have to adapt in order to rely on less technological solutions to 
achieve advantages over adversaries. 
The case studies were considered for both historical examples of SOF adaptation 
successes and failures with a view to understand the potential tasks required to operate 
within the deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas. The cases were assessed from 
the standpoint of the U.S. Army’s six warfighting functions of mission command, 
movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Observations are 
compared across individual historical cases to derive overarching patterns of successful 
and unsuccessful adaptations to new operating environments. The operations were 
conducted in the enemy controlled rear echelon, now defined in MDO as the deep 
maneuver and operational deep fires area. Historically, U.S. airpower alone was not 
sufficient and therefore SOF had to adapt to overcome great adversity and will be required 
to do so again when technology and air power is heavily contested if not denied outright in 
the MDO future operating environment.80 
1. WWII Special Operations in Norway 
In 1942, British intelligence identified a heavy water treatment facility located in 
German occupied Norway. The Allies attempted to disrupt production at the plant by aerial 
bombardment, but were continuously unsuccessful due to the protective nature of terrain 
and extreme fortification of the facilities.81 The austere location, harsh winters and enemy 
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disposition made it infeasible for conventional forces to conduct a raid. A small team of 
specialized commandos was hand selected by the British Special Operations Executive 
(SOE). The team was tasked to conduct special reconnaissance and direct action to disrupt 
production of the plant. The plant was a strategic target for the Allies due to the Germans 
utilizing the facilities to create heavy water necessary in the production of an atomic bomb. 
The case study provides a vignette in which special operations commandos conducted 
special reconnaissance and direct action to fill a gap in the conventional force’s capabilities 
to destroy a strategic target in a highly contested environment.  
2. WWII Jedburghs and the French Resistance  
In June of 1940, France surrendered to Nazi Germany and the French government 
was in exile.82 The ousted French leadership kept the morale of the country alive by 
instilling a spirit of resistance throughout the population of France.83 The friendly 
sentiment of the population to the Allies primed the environment for the use of 
Unconventional Warfare. The Allies used the tactic of aerial bombardment to induce a cost 
on the German occupiers. However, aerial bombardment proved to have minimum effects 
on the enemy due to the inability to identify targets, inaccuracy of the bombing and inability 
to assess the damage following the bombardment. The British SOE and U.S. Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) developed small special operations teams called Jedburghs, to fill 
a gap in capabilities of Allied Forces. SOE and OSS Jedburgh teams conducted 
unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance and direct action in a highly denied area 
of operation to identify priority targets and enable resistance activities.  
3. Vietnam 
The Military Advisory Council Vietnam Studies and Observation Group 
(MACVSOG) began cross border reconnaissance operations into Laos in 1966.84 The 
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Green Berets of MACVSOG were the covert weapon of choice for military and political 
leadership due to the prohibition of using American troops in Laos.85 The primary job for 
the soldiers of MACVSOG was to conduct reconnaissance, limited direct action, and guide 
the bombing campaign against the logistic efforts of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Vietnam War and the cross border reconnaissance 
operations into non-permissive areas defended by the NVA provides an example of a 
conflict in which air superiority was attained for U.S. forces, but was found to be 
insufficient alone.86  The use of MACVSOG recon teams to conduct numerous tactical 
level reconnaissance missions over a prolonged period of time also presents the hazards of 
continuing to operate special reconnaissance teams within a defined geographical area after 
crossing the threshold of violence for increasing enemy counter-reconnaissance efforts. 
4. Desert Storm SCUD Hunt  
 When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in early August of 1990, the conventional Army 
leadership initially scoffed at inserting and risking Special Forces soldiers behind enemy 
lines as technology in the field of aerial reconnaissance and imagery had made a boots on 
the ground approach obsolete.87 However, the Operation Desert Storm case provides an 
example of how airpower alone, despite the introduction of advanced precision guided 
munitions and maintaining air superiority, was insufficient in finding and destroying 
mobile Scud launchers. The Gulf War provides a valuable case of conventional military 
warfare in which the niche expertise of SF and similar British SAS units was again required 
despite advances in technology. The reconnaissance and Scud hunting teams experienced 
successes but also fatal failures worthy of study as they held an absolute technological 
advantage. Within the MDO environment the technological advantage is expected to be 
negligible. The errors of Gulf War SF teams were valuable as it would be apparent that 
they made preventable mistakes in the tasks required to operate successfully in the enemy’s 
rear echelon regardless of technological advantage.  
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III. WWII SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN NORWAY 
In 1942, British Intelligence discovered that the Germans were pursuing an atomic 
bomb and were seeking heavy water being produced at a plant in Vemork, Norway as a 
component of the process.88 The geographical location of the plant made it very 
challenging to target from via traditional air bombings. The Norsk Hydro Heavy-Water 
plant was situated below a steep cliff, and the primary components of the plant critical to 
producing heavy water resided deep within the thick-walled cement structure.89 “The 
Norsk hydro-electric plant was considered a priority target by the British and it was 
attacked on several occasions, at considerable cost, both from air and ground forces.”90 
The first attempt to sabotage the plant was conducted in 1942, codenamed Operation 
Freshman. The operation resulted in the loss of two gliders filled with elite commandos 
and one Halifax aircraft that had towed the gliders to their desired locations.91 The 
reconnaissance element, code named Grouse, avoided capture and remained in place to 
facilitate future operations. The few survivors of the crash were interrogated and executed 
by their German captors in accordance with Hitler’s “Commando Order” to treat special 
operations type personnel as spies and not as uniformed combatants.92   
The second attempt, Operation Gunnerside, was conducted in 1943 and 
successfully reduced the production of Heavy-Water for six months.93 The reconnaissance  
Grouse Team, that was infilled into a remote region in the vicinity of the plant on October 
18, 1942 still remained in place provided vital intelligence to enable the planning of 
Operation Gunnerside.94 The four-man Grouse team remained in place from October 
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through February surviving a harsh winter, hunting for food and avoiding detection to 
provide mission-critical intelligence updates to facilitate operational planning. The team 
relayed intelligence updates provided via local informants and maintained physical 
surveillance on the plant to provide updates on the German composition, disposition, and 
defensive posture. The team had to endure the harsh winter environment of Norway with 
no method of resupply. They quartered in a small hunting shack out in the exposed tundra 
relying on reindeer meat and cooked moss. Their local knowledge of the terrain and winter 
survival skills enabled the team to remain undetected by the German security forces who 
patrolled the area. 
Norwegian Army Officer Lt Joachim Ronneberg was responsible for selecting the 
personnel to carry out the raid, from the Royal Norwegian Army’s volunteers.95 These 
men were selected for their highly specialized skillsets in climbing, skiing, demolition, and 
personal knowledge of the area.96 Movement within the area of operations conducted by 
the teams consisted of foot, snowshoe, and skis following their aerial infiltration. Highly 
specialized winter mountaineering skills enabled them the freedom of maneuver to avoid 
enemy patrols and to attack the Norsk heavy water plant from a direction that the Germans 
did not recognize as plausible. The operation’s planned withdrawal relied on their ability 
to break up into small elements and cross country ski over 400 miles to the Swedish border. 
The men were selected for their winter mobility skillsets. All of the men were trained at 
special schools organized by the Special Operations Executive (SOE), created by the 
British Special Intelligence Agency to conduct operations against Germany.97  
The raid was carried out by ten men total. One maintained communications via 
radio, and nine commandos entered the Norsk Hydro plant.98 On the night of February 27, 
1943, nine commandos conducted their final pre-mission checks and began the long 
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approach to the hydro-plant.99  The men skied to the top of a steep ravine, donned British 
uniforms and concealed their skis. They changed into British uniforms so their actions 
would be non-attributional to the local Norwegian populace.100 The men then climbed 
down to the bottom of the ravine. The team crossed an ice bridge and then climbed a steep 
rock cliff to reach the perimeter of the compound undetected by German guards. Their 
primary point of entry into the facility was locked, but the team was able to adapt due to 
their extensive study of the facility during planning. The team set the explosives on the 
electrolysis chambers, the most vulnerable critical component of the heavy water 
production and set the fuse. Upon successful destruction of the facility, the team retraced 
their steps back to their stowed away gear. The team left a Thompson machine gun to 
further indicate that this was a British operation to reduce the risk of reprisals on the local 
population. The work of ten men destroyed the Germans’ heavy water stock and shut down 
production for three months. Despite the fact that the Germans mobilized three thousand 
commandos to track down the saboteurs, the entire team escaped. Four members skied over 
400 kilometers to Sweden, two went to Oslo to continue operations, and four reintegrated 
back into the local resistance. 
This was also an exercise of deception. During the pursuit of the atom bomb, 
through research and development, British and American scientists identified graphite as 
being significantly more efficient as a medium compared to heavy water. The allies 
continued to attack the heavy water facility to deliberately deceive the Germans so they 
would continue the production of heavy water and pursue that method of stabilization. “The 
more the Allies paid attention to Vemork, the more the Germans valued heavy water.”101 
The message the allies were sending was received. The material must have been important 
if the allies were willing to continually risk forces and conduct operations to disrupt the 
Germans’ production. The Nazis mistakenly pursued the wrong path, delaying their 
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progress towards achieving the nuclear bomb.102 The many costly attempts to disrupt 
production of heavy water at Vemork yielded significant strategic benefits.  
 These subversive operations conducted against the heavy water facility and 
throughout Norway during the course of the war resulted in the Germans diverting time, 
resources, and significant manpower away from the main front of the war. The number of 
German troops in Norway increased from 100,000 in 1942, to 250,000 by the end of the 
year due to the harassing operations conducted by Special Operations Forces.103 German 
forces in Norway exceeded 400,000 in 1943, having diverted resources and manpower 
away from other critical fronts to include the invasion on D-Day.104 We will now examine 
these operations conducted in Norway from the perspective of relevant warfighting 
functions. 
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Commanders use mission command to influence people both inside and outside of 
their organizations.105 Commanders create joint, interagency, and multi-national teams to 
achieve objectives.106 The internal organizational structure of the units that conducted 
Operation Gunnerside and of the Grouse team that preceded it were designed to enable 
autonomous operations. Small teams conducted operations had to make quick decisions on 
the ground to adapt and achieve mission success. Due to limited communication windows 
and sheer geographic isolation, the reconnaissance teams provided information and 
received intermittent guidance via radio message traffic. Prior to infiltration into their 
operational area, the teams were provided commander’s guidance and intent which enabled 
them to make necessary adaptations to the plan as required based on the situations they 
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faced. The success of the operation can be attributed to the high quality of individuals 
selected and their prior training. 
B. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 
The Allies had to think creatively and employ very specific forces to achieve an 
advantage over the enemy due to the German occupation of Norway.107 Operation 
Gunnerside was a significant undertaking for the allied forces. The environment was non-
permissive and any large movement of allied troops would have attracted an overwhelming 
amount of combat power by the German military. The operation would have been 
unsuccessful or a suicide mission if a larger more conventional force was used to 
accomplish the raid.  
Allied forces achieved an advantage over German forces by remaining in extremely 
small size elements to conduct their operations in highly adverse terrain and winter 
conditions. Employment of forces into their operational area consisted of low signature 
airborne infiltration via short takeoff and landing aircraft at low altitudes. Movement within 
the area of operations conducted by the teams consisted of foot, snowshoe, and skis 
following their aerial infiltration. Highly specialized winter mountaineering skills enabled 
them the freedom of maneuver to avoid German patrols and to attack the Norsk heavy 
water plant from a direction that the Germans did not recognize as plausible. Their local 
knowledge and expertise in the local environment enabled them to survive and operate in 
a place no one would suspect. These skillsets required for the operation already existed 
within the men chosen for the operation as it is not feasible to mass-produce personnel with 
the skill sets necessary for this type of operation.  
The small teams operating in the denied environment of Norway had to 
continuously balance effectiveness and survivability. The operations could not raise the 
threshold effectiveness to a point that would result in the Germans deploying sizable forces 
to one specific location to find, fix and destroy the small team. However, the operations 
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had to be effective enough to result in the deployment of German forces throughout 
Norway.  
C. INTELLIGENCE   
Operation Gunnerside provides an excellent opportunity to assess the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures used during World War II to meet specific intelligence 
requirements in a highly restrictive environment. The operation was planned, coordinated, 
and executed based on detailed and continuous intelligence updates provided by a 
reconnaissance located in the operational area and local nationals. As one member of the 
team accounted, “I don’t think I say too much if I state that there has never been any 
operation done in continental Europe with so good information on the target as we had.”108 
The intelligence and preparations that Operation Gunnerside benefitted from were partly 
due to the failure of Operation Freshman conducted before it. The Gunnerside team 
members used the Freshman maps, intelligence, mock-ups, and equipment lists that were 
already existing. They also capitalized on human intelligence provided by local workers. 
For example Norwegian plant engineer, Dr. Brun, built a model of the plant and was able 
to answer any questions the commandos had during the planning process.109  He also 
facilitated a large model of the complex so the men could spend hours studying and 
rehearsing the layout of the plant. Their vast preparation enabled them to make quick, 
informed changes to the plan when they experienced obstacles during the operation.  
Information was relayed from Norway back to the SOE operations center, in 
London via a radio team. “Haugland and his team of three other Norwegian agents were 
parachuted into a desolate area several miles from the plant on October 18, 1942.”110 
Haugland’s task was to establish communications, via a complex radio-beam system to 
guide future glider pilots onto landing zones.111 Haugland successfully established 
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communications with England, initiating the start of Operation Freshman.112 Haugland 
and three others remained in place, following the catastrophic failure of Operation 
Freshman. He continued to report the movement of Colonel-General Nikolaus von 
Falkenhorst, commander of the German military forces in Norway and enabled the 
planning efforts for future operations.113 Haugland was notified that he would be part of 
the next attempt to disrupt production of the plant during Operation Gunnerside Haugland 
and his men remained in place for three more months. Despite freezing temperatures and 
starving conditions they reported back to their headquarters before the start of Operation 
Gunnerside.114 Due to the quality and timeliness of the intelligence provided back to 
headquarters by Haugland and his team, mission planners had the exact location of the 
heavy water cells within the High Concentration Plant.115 Due to the high confidence in 
the intelligence that planners received from the team who remained in Norway, the 
planners concluded that significant effects could be achieved by a small party.116 
D. PROTECTION 
The risk to force and risk to the mission was mitigated during Operation 
Gunnerside, by using small elements to attain strategic effects. Force protection is very 
important to special operations due to the small size of operational elements. It takes very 
few causalities to reduce an element to a non-mission capable status. Teams are often cross-
trained in a myriad of skill sets, but individuals are often specialized to conduct specific 
tasks on the team. The loss of one operator could risk mission failure. The leader of the 
operation was afforded the opportunity to select his team to conduct the operation.117 The 
harsh winter environment of Norway was exceptionally hazardous for non-specialized 
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troops.118 “The success of Operation Gunnerside illustrated both the necessity and the 
possibilities of using experts in these conditions.”119 There were very few men who 
processed the skills and local knowledge required to pull off a successful operation within 
the required timeline. Special Forces cannot be mass-produced or created after an 
emergency occurs Those chosen to execute the operation were already expert skiers and 
were very familiar with the operational area. 
The risk to mission and risk to force was very high. The teams were very small 
military elements compared to the disposition of the Germans. If the teams were discovered 
they would face death as spies. There was very little in terms of protection to their forces 
and mission, but they practiced extreme operational security and small size to decrease 
their signature. The extreme terrain and harsh winter conditions aided in concealing the 
team members from discovery. Norwegian nationals operating in their own country 
mitigated the risk through their intimate knowledge of the surrounding areas, support from 
members of the populace, and specialized winter mobility and survival skills. 
E. SUSTAINMENT   
The endurance of today’s U.S. military forces is due to the capabilities of the force 
to provide the sustainment necessary to support prolonged operations.120 Both an 
advantage and a limitation of SOF is often dependent on the ability to sustain the force in 
austere environments. In WWII, deployed SOF did not have robust systems and processes 
to receive sustainment, so they were expected to sustain themselves through hunting, 
gathering, and purchasing what they could off the local market. As seen in the Operation 
Gunnerside case study, sustainment was a significant challenge due to geographic location, 
terrain, weather and non-permissive operating environment due to German occupation. The 
only reason the SOF teams were successful was that they were highly adaptive and self-
sufficient. 
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The same factors that helped to hide the operatives also worked against them for 
sustainment efforts. Aerial resupply was minimal, and the Grouse team was forced to eat 
reindeer, moss and hunt to survive during the winter. Operating in small elements enabled 
the teams to be creative and adaptive in order to sustain themselves off resources available. 
While it may not be necessary for SOF to train individuals on the procurement of reindeer 
and moss; the greater array of skillset individuals possess will increase the unit’s 
survivability and adaptability. Individuals asked to conduct operations in the strategic rear 
echelon of an adversary will have to possess a myriad of skills and knowledge in order to 
deal with the unexpected issues in which they will certainly face. In lieu of having lived in 
the area of operations as the members of Gunnerside had, special operations of similar 
design would require long term planning and preparation of the operators assigned to the 
task in order to replicate such survival and evasion skills.  
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IV. WWII: JEDBURGHS AND THE FRENCH RESISTANCE 
In June of 1940, France surrendered to Nazi Germany, and French General Charles 
de Gaulle was exiled to London.121 Charles de Gaulle became known as the “last great 
Frenchman,” and is credited with keeping the nation’s morale alive during its time of 
occupation by Germany.122 The Latin word resistere, to hold back, became an infamous 
French term used to provide the people of France hope and mobilize its countrymen to 
oppose the German’s occupation through armed and violent means. De Gaulle coined the 
term “resistance” in his first radio broadcast from London on June 18, 1940.123 De Gaulle 
understood that communication through written and oral means was a form of action in 
itself that would result in a powerful psychological response from the populace.124 
Through this concept, de Gaulle was able to create a complex underground organization 
that published hundreds of clandestine newspapers circulated to millions of people.125 By 
1944, the Free French mobilized approximately 250,000 guerrilla fighters and provided the 
underground leadership capable of running the French government once liberated.126 De 
Gaulle’s fledgling organization did not go unnoticed by the British and American 
governments in 1940. Both the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and soon to be 
American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) synchronized operations to capitalize on the 
capabilities of the Free French and gain a marked advantage over German forces in 
occupied France.  
The Allied Forces of World War II faced a highly capable and determined enemy 
willing to fight an unlimited war. The high stakes of World War II required creativity and 
innovation to gain any possible advantage over the adversary. Prior to World War II, the 
                                                 
121 Kritzman, “A Certain Idea of de Gaulle,” 157. 
122 Kritzman, 157. 
123 Wright, “Reflections on the French Resistance (1940–1944),” 337. 
124 Kritzman, “A Certain Idea of de Gaulle,” 158. 
125 Wright, “Reflections on the French Resistance (1940–1944),” 337. 
126 Wright, 337. 
32 
United States did not have any official organizations designed to conduct “shadow wars” 
or what is known today as special operations. The United States foreign intelligence service 
was lacking in capabilities and extremely primitive.127 The U.S. had a history of aversion 
to spies and use of espionage, as it was considered at the time to be a dishonorable method 
of warfare.128 However, the onset of WWII required creative new solutions to gain an 
advantage over the enemy. The United States created the OSS to fill a much-needed gap in 
capabilities to conduct operations in the enemy’s rear echelon, capable of enabling strategic 
intelligence collection and conducting sabotage operations. Fortunately, for the United 
States, Britain had two years of experience conducting these types of actions. Much of the 
training, manning and equipping of the OSS mirrored the SOE.129 
A. THE BRITISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE 
At the onset of the war in Europe, specifically the fall of France to the Nazis in 
1940, Britain established the SOE. The SOE was designed to conduct operations in enemy-
controlled areas to organize movements, conduct sabotage, and collect intelligence.130 The 
SOE was  created to provide Britain a unit that could conduct operations on behalf of the 
British government in methods employed by terrorist organizations such as the Sinn Fein 
movement in Ireland, Chinese Guerillas in Japan, and the internationally established Nazi 
Democratic International.131 All of these movements utilized information warfare and 
propaganda to mobilize disenfranchised or socially excluded sub-populations. SOE and 
eventually the OSS learned to weaponize these movements to enable conventional 
maneuver warfare. The Brits understood that the resistance movements, particularly in 
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France, could not match German forces in armed combat, but they could contribute to the 
war effort by means of disrupting and attriting German rear-area forces. 
B. CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
In 1940, President Roosevelt was looking for options to improve the strategic 
intelligence collecting capabilities of the United States, so he sent former Assistant U.S. 
Attorney General, Wall Street lawyer, and WW1 hero Bill Donovan on his behalf to 
observe Britain’s intelligence and “shadow-war” capabilities.132 Donovan’s visit initiated 
a close relationship between the U.S. and British intelligence collection and sabotage 
organizations. Upon the U.S. entering World War II on December 7, 1942, the president 
conducted a series of executive actions to synchronize U.S. war efforts.133 Of the many 
efforts to synchronize U.S. intelligence operations, one of which included the 
establishment of the OSS.134 Bill Donovan led the organization through a series of rapidly 
developed capabilities and ensured there was a significant emphasis on combined arms 
warfare.135  
Donovan’s concept for the OSS and method to level the playing field between the 
U.S. and Germany was to “play a bush-league game, stealing the ball and killing the 
umpire.”136 The core of Donovan’s method of warfare relied on what he referred to as 
special operations forces. These forces were trained and equipped to conduct infiltration 
behind enemy lines. Once the teams were established forward of the friendly line of troops, 
they would be synchronized to “sow mayhem in rear areas.”137 The experiences of World 
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War II provide the origins of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the special 
operations community relies on today. 
C. JEDBURGH TEAM COMPOSITION 
In the summer of 1944, a total of ninety-nine Allied special operations three-man 
teams conducted airborne infiltration into Nazi Germany to link up with resistance forces 
and enable the advancement of Allied ground forces.138 The teams were known as 
“Jedburghs,” code-named after a town in the vicinity of the Scottish-English border.139 
They were an all-volunteer force specifically trained in guerilla warfare tactics.140 Their 
task was to raise and arm civilians within occupied France to resist German occupation by 
conducting sabotage of rail and communications lines.141 OSS operations conducted by 
Jedburgh teams behind the main lines disrupted the Germans’ ability to mobilize troops to 
counter U.S. and Allied beach landings.142 OSS operations provided the majority of the 
intelligence enabling Allied landings in southern France by confirming German troop 
locations, capabilities, and supply depot locations.143 The OSS continued to provide 
invaluable strategic intelligence that facilitated Allied operations throughout the war.144 
The Jedburgh Teams were uniformed soldiers consisting of two officers and a non-
commissioned officer (NCO) who served as a communications specialist.145 There were 
exceptions to this structure and in some cases the teams consisted of three officers. 
However, under most circumstances, the teams consisted of a senior officer, junior officer, 
and an enlisted radio operator. Each team was equipped with a Wireless Telegram (W/T) 
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set and a trained operator.146 Upon successful infiltration, they made immediate contact 
with their respective higher headquarters. Communication between the teams and 
headquarters consisted of Morse code transmissions and occurred, on average, once a day 
between the teams and higher headquarters.147 Many of the teams consisted of French, 
British and American nationals trained and equipped by the U.S. OSS. The teams were 
deliberately multi-national to appease political concerns of the British, that the U.S. was 
conducting unilateral covert operations, and to facilitate the synchronization of the British 
SOE and U.S. OSS organizations.148 The multi-national teams also facilitated operations 
by blending in with the local populace and providing native French speakers to enable 
coordination with the French Resistance.149  
D. JEDBURGH TEAM TASKS  
The purpose of the Jedburgh teams was to arm and train the remaining able-bodied 
French civilians comprising of the French Resistance and disrupt enemy lines of 
communication.150 Jedburgh Team Gilbert’s actions were well documented and provides 
a valuable insight into the tasks Jedburgh teams conducted. Jedburgh Team Gilbert 
consisted of British Captain Blathwayt, French Lieutenant Charron and British Sergeant 
Wood.151 Team Gilbert conducted airborne infiltration into Finistere, France on the night 
of 9/10 July 1944.152 The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) 
planned to use Team Gilbert and three other Jedburgh Teams in the Finistere area, to create 
a large diversion to enable the forward progress of Allied conventional forces.153 Team 
Gilbert was one of four teams; Team Frederick, George, and Giles were also working in 
                                                 
146 John Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception 
During the World War II Era (New York, NY: Garland, 1989). 
147 Mendelsohn. 
148 Mendelsohn, xiii. 
149 Mendelsohn, xii–xiii. 
150 Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944, 4. 
151 Mendelsohn, Covert Warfare, 408. 
152 Mendelsohn, 408. 
153 Mendelsohn, 408. 
36 
the Finistere area due to the large pool of resistance fighters reported to be available in the 
area.154 Although there were four teams assigned to the Department of Finistere, each team 
had an assigned separate area of operation coordinated by SFHQ.155 The primary task for 
Team Gilbert was to identify suitable drop zones to receive supplies for the resistance and 
coordinate reception parties to secure the dropped goods.156 Team Gilbert was briefed to 
organize the resistance into units of no more than 100 men and avoid contact with German 
forces until the following BBC message was received “Is the Napolean hat still at Perros 
Guirec.”157 Upon receipt of the coded message the team was to activate and utilize all 
available resistance forces to inflict issues and delay German forces as much as possible.  
On 02 August, SFHQ sent Team Gilbert the following message, “Most important 
maintain current harassing activity but prevent a general flare-up until you get orders.”158 
Team Gilbert replied back that they would continue to destroy three trains of munitions 
each evening to maintain the status quo of operations.159 On 04 August SFHQ messaged 
the team, “Advancing Allied Troops lay great stress on military intelligence” and tasked 
the team with specific intelligence collection requirements.160 Later the same day SFHQ 
messages the team, “In view of rapid Allied advance orders for maximum activity. All 
isolated detachments should be attacked and all measures are taken to complete 
demoralization of enemy.”161 The team reported back where 2000 German forces 
remained in center of town, but the resistance fighters controlled the countryside.162 They 
also provided future locations for safe airborne infiltration of Allied troops to reinforce and 
provided atmospherics that the enemy morale was low with a high likelihood of surrender. 
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SFHQ acknowledged and provided Team Gilbert detailed instructions to “preserve all 
permanent works in your area from destruction and any harassing activities must not 
destroy major works.”163 This provides one example, of many, in which a team was 
provided specific tasks to restrict their activities to control escalation of their activities and 
then in a short time frame later requested the team to provide as much disruption to German 
forces in their area of operations as possible. This illustrates the flexibility and capabilities 
of Special Operations forces that have access to denied areas and are combined with 
capable resistance forces to provide timely intelligence and conduct shaping operations to 
enable combined maneuver warfare. 
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL  
The OSS required a complex system of processes, networks, and command posts 
to synchronize and converge combat power due to the complexity of joint and multi-
national units and the non-permissive environment in which they were operating.164  The 
area of responsibility for the OSS was geographically vast and isolated the command and 
control elements from the teams. These conditions, combined with the limited 
communication technology available in the 1940s, required significant emphasis, time, and 
planning to be committed to successfully command and control OSS operations.  
To overcome the challenges of the operational environment, the OSS established a 
robust organization consisting of multiple tiers and varying tasks to synchronize and 
support ground operations. Significant emphasis was placed on ensuring coordination was 
conducted between the OSS and conventional Army counter-parts. The Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) created special forces detachments 
to facilitate command and control between the Jedburgh teams and the conventional field 
armies.165 The special forces detachments resided at each Field Army headquarters and 
each Army Group headquarters.166 The special forces detachments, responsible for 
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coordinating and de-conflicting Jedburgh operations consisted of roughly 12 officers and 
20 enlisted men.167 These liaison units created a mechanism for the Commanding General 
of the Army to direct and synchronize the unconventional activities of the Jedburghs to 
enable conventional military maneuver warfare.168 Despite primitive means of 
communication, the activities of the teams were highly controlled and synchronized by 
higher headquarter units to increase their overall operational effectiveness and to enable 
the maneuver of Allied combat forces. They were provided with an initial commander’s 
guidance and intent prior to infiltration, but the daily Jedburgh operations orders were 
received via radio. The teams were in denied areas, and communications with higher 
headquarters could not always be relied upon so the teams had to be prepared to conduct 
operations autonomously if required.  
Upon review of multiple message logs between various Jedburgh teams and their 
respective higher headquarters, it is very apparent that they received significant guidance 
and last-minute fragmentary orders. Frequently, advancing Allied troops would outpace 
the speed of intelligence available to them. As a result, headquarters would task Jedburgh 
teams to mobilize their resistance to conduct reconnaissance operations to provide a 
common operating picture of the forward line of troops (FLOT) and beyond into the deep 
maneuver area. For example, on 4 August 1944, Team Gilbert was ordered to mobilize 30 
personnel to conduct reconnaissance on a specific target list provided to them, and then 
report to the nearest Allied forces. Four days after the initial order to maintain a low 
signature Team Gilbert received a message on 6 August 1944, to “do everything possible 
for next two days to hold and preserve bridges along main roads.” The conventional fight 
was a dynamic and fluid environment. The Jedburgh teams adapted and responded rapidly 
to support the offensive maneuvers of the conventional fight in near real-time due to the 
complex network of liaisons and headquarters OSS established.  
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F. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER   
The director of OSS, Bill Donovan, provided a unique perspective and encouraged 
the unit to be creative while problem solving and developing options to gain military 
advantages for the Allied forces. The OSS was not a risk-averse organization. Donovan’s 
concept of warfare enabled the OSS to gain a distinct advantage over the Germans. The 
placement of U.S. forces into German controlled territory was impossible for conventional 
forces. Donovan ensured his organization followed his philosophy: “If you fall, fall 
forward” and “If you don’t risk, you don’t win.”169 The movement and maneuver 
warfighting function is how a military force projects power and conducts maneuver to gain 
a marked advantage over the enemy.170 The unique skills of the OSS enabled them to 
mitigate higher levels of risk and to gain a marked advantage over the adversary by 
enabling resistance through unconventional warfare. The OSS were small light forces 
placed in areas where the enemy had the majority of tactical advantages, but their unique 
methods of shadow warfare mitigated any loss of tactical advantages to the Germans. The 
OSS conducted special operations consisting of strategic intelligence collection, deception, 
and sabotage to enable conventional military forces to gain surprise and achieve 
momentum. The resistance forces chose the place and time they would attack German 
forces when they were vulnerable.  
Shadow warfare, known as unconventional warfare today was not well accepted or 
understood by his conventional military counter-parts.171 As the war progressed, his new 
concepts proved to be both effective and value-added to the war effort. Shadow warfare 
consisted of “sabotage and guerilla operations to soften up an area before conventional 
forces invaded.”172 
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G. INTELLIGENCE 
Information and intelligence are critical to understanding the enemy, terrain and 
civil considerations of any conflict.173 The environment in occupied France was a 
knowledge gap for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Commander. The OSS Jedburgh 
teams were a means to identify friendly forces composition, disposition, and combat 
effectiveness. The Jedburgh teams reporting also provided the Allied commanders with 
information on the environment forward of friendly lines deep in enemy-controlled 
territory. The network of French Resistance cells that Jedburgh teams managed provided 
access and placement to locations where conventional uniformed personnel could not 
collect.  
The Jedburgh team primary task was to support the resistance movement by 
organizing, advising, and equipping them. However, the teams were often called upon to 
conduct deliberate and hasty reconnaissance operations to aid advancing Allied Forces. 
Jedburgh Teams Gilbert and Gavin were conducting operations in vicinity of Brittany 
France when they were tasked with specific intelligence collection requirements.174 
Special Forces Headquarters sent message traffic on behalf of the Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Forces that due to quickly advancing Allied forces intelligence was of extreme 
importance.175 The teams were tasked to “select volunteers with local knowledge to meet 
advancing troops and report enemy dispositions.”176 Similar tasks were given to many of 
the teams conducting operations in France in 1944. Often local resistance forces were 
tasked specific priority intelligence reporting requirements and then they were to report 
directly to the G2 Intelligence officer of the nearest Allied Force upon which they would 
aid operations as a local guide.  
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Prior to going into the field, all Jedburgh Teams were provided friendly unit 
locations, resistance elements in the area and enemy troop movements in the area.177 Some 
teams received more detailed information such as specific locations of police and Gestapo, 
topography of the area and key lines of communication such as roads and railways.178 
H. FIRES 
Similar to intelligence collection, the Jedburgh team’s primary task was supporting 
the resistance networks. However, the Jedburgh team’s also enabled conventional forces 
targeting process by capitalizing on the vast network of the French Resistance. When the 
conventional Allied forces started to make expedited territory gains into less known areas 
or outrun their intelligence picture the Jedburgh Teams were tasked to support operations 
by identifying targets and providing battle damage assessments following a bombardment. 
On 4, August 1944 Team Gilbert was tasked to provide information on enemy disposition, 
troop concentrations, tank harbors, and other that could be prosecuted via airstrikes.179 
Gilbert report to SFHQ, “Boche column 50 vehicles on road Quimper Rosporden going 
east, most Patriot vehicles marked with flags, can you help from air?”180 The Jedburghs 
never had dedicated fires by today’s standards, but they did request fire support and 
facilitate Allied targeting.  
I. PROTECTION   
The protection warfighting function is the techniques and systems used by 
commanders to preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power 
to accomplish the mission.”181 The majority of Jedburgh teams infilled into France did not 
encounter Germany’s main fighting forces.182 The teams were infiltrated into places that 
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created preferable odds for the teams to encounter German rear echelon troops such as 
supply or administrative units.183 This methodology increased the survivability and 
effectiveness of the teams. Teams were also created as multi-national teams consisting of 
French-British-American nationals trained and managed by the U.S. OSS.184 These 
enabled Jedburgh operatives to blend in with the local populace and not attract attention 
from the German security forces.  
The Germans had a basic understanding of the composition and disposition of the 
French resistance.185 The Germans assumed that the majority of the French population 
sympathized with French Resistance cause. The sympathy of the population provided the 
Jedburghs and resistance forces a semi-permissive environment to operate. Even with the 
sentiment of the local population on the side of the resistance, the Jedburgh teams had to 
exercise extreme caution and maintain high levels of operational security due to small 
portions of the French population willing to provide information to the German security 
forces.186 The Germans assumed that the French security and police forces were not 
putting full emphasis on locating and illuminating the OSS and French resistance cells.187 
This was mostly true, so the Germans created their own Gestapo organization tasked to 
target the OSS and members of the resistance. The resistance was a network of cells and 
smaller organizations in which were highly compartmentalized. The compartmentalization 
of the organization degraded the Germans’ targeting process and protected sections of the 
organization when others were compromised.  
The SHAEF and OSS understood how vulnerable the French resistance forces 
would be if they were exposed to German security forces. SHAEF took great measures to 
ensure that resistance organizations remained small, less than 100 men and did not mass 
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together.188 SHAEF also directly ordered Jedburgh teams to limit “attacks against German 
troops, except when necessary to fulfill orders from high command.”189 The French 
resistance was able to conduct operations in an area without meeting significant German 
resistance, as long as they did not break the level of threshold triggering the Germans to 
send in large formations of troops.190 The Jedburgh teams played a significant role in 
managing the threshold of violence in which the resistance conducted operations to enable 
the resistance forces to attrit German forces without assuming too much risk to their forces. 
J. SUSTAINMENT 
The endurance of U.S. military forces is due to the capabilities of the force to 
provide the sustainment necessary to support prolonged operations.191 The Jedburgh teams 
enabled the resistance forces to sustain their operations. The sustainment of the resistance 
was vital to the success of the French Resistance and the Jedburghs. Jedburgh teams 
conducted infiltration into their assigned operational areas with a standard radio set, 
personal gear, and minimum supplies. Once the teams linked up with their assigned 
resistance counterparts they contacted their headquarters in London to request additional 
supplies and weapons.192 They identified suitable and feasible drop zones capable of 
receiving food, fuel and ammunition dropped via the air. The Jedburghs also were 
responsible for coordinating security of the drop zone, transportation and manpower to 
move the supplies. On average it would take about eight days from the receipt of the supply 
request until the teams received delivery of the requested materials.193 
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V. VIETNAM 
The cross border operations conducted by special operations soldiers during the 
Vietnam War produced some of the most important successes and procedural lessons 
learned from the war. U.S. Army Special Forces, known as “Green Berets” were credited 
after the war with tying down as much as one North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalion to 
defend the Ho Chi Minh Trail for every actively operational recon team member.194 
Additionally, the soldiers and indigenous personnel of Military Assistance Council 
Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG) are credited with attaining a kill 
to loss ratio of 150:1 in 1969.195 During that same year, the U.S. Air Force supported 
special operations to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail with hundreds of sorties and 433,000 
tons of bombs. However, despite this herculean effort to disrupt the transport of goods on 
the trail, only 13.5 percent of North Vietnamese supplies were destroyed.196 The purpose 
of this study of MACVSOG cross border operations is not to suggest what the U.S. military 
could have done differently to attrit the logistical effort of the North Vietnamese along the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail. Rather, it is to glean lessons from the MACVSOG’s successes and 
shortfalls to apply to the modern-day U.S. Special Forces core tasks of special 
reconnaissance and direct action in the deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas of 
the Multi-Domain Operations concept. 
A. THE TRAIL 
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, originally called the “Truong Son Route,” was renamed in 
honor of North Vietnam’s revolutionary leader and began as a 1,000-kilometer road that 
infiltrated troops from North Vietnam through the Laotian mountains and back into South 
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Vietnam.197 Throughout the war, the Trail was constantly expanded into a network of more 
than 20,000 kilometers of roads and footpaths that ultimately reached Cambodia.198 The 
Ho Chi Minh Trail acted as both a logistical lifeline and as a staging area for the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Prior to the South Vietnamese Navy cutting North Vietnam’s 
sea supply routes in 1965, approximately seventy percent of communist logistics had 
traveled via the water.199 Due to the U.S. Naval blockade of the sea routes, the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail took on a new level of importance for the PAVN as the lifeblood for their war 
effort and became a high priority target for the U.S. military for interdiction. In the first 
few months of 1965, the Trail saw a fifty percent, or 5,000 troops, increase in traffic 
compared to 1964.200 Despite the Trail’s increased usage, the U.S. military was unable to 
deploy conventional units across the Vietnam-Laos border due to the 1962 Geneva Accords 
which stated that neither the United States nor North Vietnam nor any of either nation’s 
allies were permitted to conduct ground operations within Laos.201 The 1962 Accords were 
disregarded by the PAVN; however, the U.S. military was restricted to the agreed-upon 
policy. As a method to work around the political restriction the U.S. opted to utilize 
secretive special operations forces and only after significant internal political opposition 
had been overcome. Prior to the decision to send in the Special Forces the U.S. Air Force 
conducted two major operations, Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger, in attempts to attack truck 
convoys on the Trail with the idea of creating a traffic jam that would provide additional 
targets for prosecution.202 However, the triple canopy jungle combined with the PAVN’s 
camouflage efforts and the high speed of the attack aircraft produced minimal results.203  
The inability to deploy conventional troops and the naturally defensive nature of the Trail 
and its environment to thwart target acquisition by U.S. aircraft eventually demanded the 
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addition of a ground-based reconnaissance approach to finding and destroying the PAVN 
logistical apparatus. These conditions set the stage for the Military Assistance Council, 
Vietnam (MACV) to establish the Studies and Observations Group (MACVSOG) in an 
effort to deter North Vietnam’s use of Laos for military logistics and maneuver.204 
B. LEAPING LENA 
The first ground operation against the Ho Chi Minh Trail occurred in 1961 with the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) creation of a network of trained Laotian tribesmen 
who were to watch, report, and potentially photograph activity along the Trail.205 The 
CIA’s personnel held reservations concerning the trail watchers’ effectiveness as 
communication with them was limited, and the cameras they were provided were often 
lost.206 The tribesmen provided broad metrics of the Trail’s usage to their handlers; 
however, this was a far step removed from being able to interdict PAVN assets. The first 
military operation conducted by MACV against the Trail began on May 1964 and avoided 
the use of American troops. The operation codenamed “Leaping Lena” involved training 
teams of Montagnard tribesmen led by South Vietnamese Special Forces or Luc Luong 
Dac Biet (LLDB) who were parachuted into Laos to conduct reconnaissance missions 
against the Trail.207 However, the indigenous teams of Leaping Lena were far less capable 
than military leadership had hoped. One U.S. Special Forces advisor was quoted as saying 
“you had to damn near force them on the plane at the point of a gun.”208 When the forces 
were inserted into Laos almost all were captured or killed in short order. Of the forty 
personnel trained and inserted only six returned alive and with no information of 
intelligence value.209 Although Leaping Lena was a failure, it did result in recognition by 
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the military and political leadership that if any future cross-border operations were to be 
successful they would need to be led covertly by U.S. personnel.210 
C. RECON TEAMS 
Understanding the need to stem the flow of PAVN supplies and personnel into 
South Vietnam and the inability to attack the Trail without boots on the ground, President 
Johnson signed General Order 6 into effect creating the classified MACVSOG within the 
MACV in January 1964.211 Codenamed OP 35, the Ground Studies Group, were the 
primary MACVSOG section in charge of interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.212 OP 35 
spent the next two years recruiting, training, and convincing the senior leaders of MACV 
and the Johnston administration that U.S. personnel would not suffer to the same fate as 
the Leaping Lena operation. In 1966 OP 35 was finally permitted to begin reconnaissance 
operations under the classified title “Shining Brass” supported by tactical aircraft sorties 
against PAVN targets on the Trail.213 
The weapon of choice to conduct reconnaissance of the Trail within Laos was recon 
teams made up of three Americans and nine indigenous troops.214 Due to the majority of 
the team being comprised of indigenous personnel, the casualties incurred would 
theoretically be proportional, and U.S. casualties kept to a minimum.215 The American 
members of the recon teams were typically veteran Special Forces personnel who had been 
employed previously within Vietnam as members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group 
(CIDG) program. Uncharacteristically for military units, the leadership of the recon teams 
was not chosen by rank, but by experience level and one’s skill at operating within the 
jungles of Laos and Vietnam.216 Training for the recon soldiers of MACVSOG was not 
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specially tailored beyond the requirements to become a Green Beret prior to their 
assignment to the secretive unit. In fact, the standards had been lowered in the late 1960s 
due to mounting casualties from a minimum of 20 years of age and a rank of specialist four 
to 19 years old and private first class.217  
New Special Forces soldiers assigned to the dangerous recon mission quickly found 
that their instruction and training fell far short of what was required to survive. One SOG 
recon veteran described the situation as, “To prevail in these conditions demanded long-
forgotten skills, tracking, counter-tracking, stealth, stalking, concealment, 
bushwhacking…. The skills were identifiable, yet there were no applicable field manuals, 
no books, no training films, not even lesson plans.”218 As a result, the recon teams focused 
heavily on training newcomers to acquire the skills they would need to survive and succeed. 
They were also given a wide berth to conduct weapons and demolition ranges without the 
oversight of normal U.S. Army safety procedures and protocols.219 This freedom allowed 
the teams to innovate with a variety of weapons, tactics, and explosives. The teams’ 
training combined with the often fatal trial and error experience of actual missions into 
Laos developed specific extraction harnesses, demolition charges, and tactics that would 
be implemented in future organizations and conflicts.220 Despite the successes of training 
conducting in theater to prepare the recon teams and adapt to the enemy’s tactics, SOG lost 
163 personnel killed in action with another 80 listed as missing in action during the nine 
years it was operational.221 In today’s SF organization, this is the equivalent to losing one 
fully manned battalion of Green Berets. In comparison, between 2001 and September 2019, 
190 Green Berets have died in combat.222   
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The only dedicated rescue mechanism for recon team personnel was the Bright 
Light teams.223 These teams were recon personnel that were forward staged at the Vietnam 
border helicopter launching sites that would be ready to assist if an emergency extraction 
was required. Due to the political sensitivities of the cross border operations, conventional 
ground combat troops were not available to assist in this role. The successful extraction of 
a recon team under fire was often entirely dependent upon the available air support and the 
heroics of the handful of personnel currently serving Bright Light duty. 
The recon teams were inserted via helicopter across the border where they moved 
undetected to a designated area to conduct a variety of reconnaissance and surveillance 
tasks. Once they had located PAVN forces, the recon teams contacted a forward air 
controller (FAC) flying overhead to request and direct air sorties against the targets.224 
Soon after OP35 began conducting cross border reconnaissance of the Trail, military and 
governmental leaders realized that the recon teams could be tasked to conduct a myriad of 
activities in addition to calling in airstrikes. The scope of operations that the recon teams 
conducted was expanded to include: wiretapping, capturing PAVN personnel, 
emplacement of unattended ground sensors, and bomb damage assessment (BDA).225 
Predictably, the recon teams became a popular asset for their ability to cause havoc along 
the Trail. Each patrol varied in duration and the amount of terrain the team would cover. 
During the early years some missions called for the teams to conduct active reconnaissance 
for weeks or as short as 48 hours. On average OP 35 conducted 11 recon patrols per month 
in 1966, and at the height of the program in 1969, the organization was up to 37 patrols per 
month.226 In terms of distances the team could travel, the terrain of the Laos-Vietnam 
border was unforgiving and highly restrictive. Recon team members reported only being 
able to move an average of 1500m from the point of insertion due to dense jungle, enemy 
activity, or a combination of the two.227 The duration and distances covered by the recon 
                                                 
223 Plaster, Secret Commandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, 81. 
224 Gillespie, Black Ops, Vietnam: An Operational History of MACVSOG, 77. 
225 Gillespie, 77. 
226 Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets, 21. 
227 Rosenau, 21. 
51 
teams became shorter and smaller over time as the PAVN became more aware of the 
operations and initiated countermeasures against the OP 35 personnel and their indigenous 
team members.228 
D. EXPANSION OF “SHINING BRASS” 
With the success of the initial recon teams’ ability to accurately strike PAVN assets 
on the Trail, the Shining Brass operation was expanded to include exploitation battalions 
called “Haymaker Forces.”229 These exploitation battalions and their subordinate three 
companies with four platoons each were used up to a depth of 10km into Laos with the 
caveat that only one platoon at a time was able to be involved in any single operation. This 
was done to limit the observable degree in which the 1962 Accords were being broken.230 
These larger forces, much like the recon teams, were also made up of a small contingent of 
U.S. Special Forces in leadership roles with a majority of indigenous personnel. The 
exploitation battalions were able to place enough force forward to attack small enemy 
elements that had been sent into disarray by recon team airstrikes. In one particularly risky 
operation, a company was used to draw the attention of a larger enemy force and then 
defend itself with massive amounts of airpower before being forced to withdraw.231 The 
rise of the exploitation forces gave birth to the Search-Location and Annihilation Mission 
(SLAM) concept.232 A SLAM operation consisted of three phases, intelligence and 
reconnaissance, massive airstrikes, and then insertion of the exploitation forces.233 Often, 
once the exploitation forces were inserted into an area via helicopter, they would find and 
report additional targets for airstrikes in addition to providing BDA of the initial airstrikes. 
Four SLAM operations were carried out between 1966 and 1967. SLAM IV received 
strong pushback from the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, William H. Sullivan, as his 
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authorization was continuously required in order to conduct planned airstrikes within the 
country. Due to the Embassy’s reluctance to approve SLAM IV, future SLAM operations 
were scaled down. 
E. CONVENTIONALIZATION OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL 
By 1967 the codename Shining Brass had been published in Ramparts magazine 
and was changed to Prairie Fire as a result.234 The cross-border operations of OP 35 
continued until put into a temporary hiatus caused by the Tet Offensive in 1968. For nine 
months after the commencement of the Tet Offensive, the recon teams of MACVSOG were 
turned into conventional assets for the U.S. Army within the borders of South Vietnam 
where they conducted 236 operations.235 The conventional Army commanders were 
pleased to have the secretive and seemingly unruly Special Forces soldiers brought back 
into the fold. This was a continuation of MACV’s attempt to rein in MACVSOG, by 
placing conventional officers in positions of leadership within the organization.236 
Doctrinally, MACV was already using SOG for tactical level objectives, so it was a short 
jump to repurpose the specialized force for their own needs. Conducting ambushes and 
airstrikes against tactical targets are conventional tasks capable of being conducted by 
infantry or cavalry scouts. Using a specialized force for repeated tactical level gain is 
effective, however, doing so will also attrit a difficult to replace asset and should be 
avoided.237 Green Berets were being used in Laos due to the covert nature of the operation 
and the extreme danger requiring specially trained personnel, although they were tactical 
level targets. The high casualty rate of Green Berets during the time that MACVSOG was 
active is indicative of the risk of repeatedly using special operations troops against tactical 
level objectives.238 The use of indigenous personnel to fill out the recon teams and 
exploitation forces to lower U.S. casualties while increasing capability was, however, in 
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line with the unconventional doctrine of the Special Forces. Special Forces recon teams 
once again conducted cross-border operations during the last three months of 1968 but 
were still tasked with supporting conventional unit maneuvers within South Vietnam.239 
F. THE ENEMY GETS A VOTE 
As the ground reconnaissance and exploitation mission of OP 35 continued, so did 
the resources and countermeasures of the PAVN to counter the SOG soldiers. The North 
Vietnamese instituted a network of personnel dedicated to watching the usable helicopter 
landing zones on the Laotian side of the border, much as the CIA had attempted to do 
several years earlier with the Trail network. With an early warning of approaching 
helicopters, local NVA commanders were able to immediately dispatch specially trained 
trackers and hunter-killer teams to find the SOG recon soldiers. Additionally, anti-aircraft 
artillery began to appear in defense of the Trail in 1965, and by 1970 the entire route was 
bristling with guns and a handful of radar stations. The PAVN’s countermeasures resulted 
in relatively shortened mission durations and an increasing casualty rate of SOG members. 
Recon team missions by 1969 averaged only two days on the ground post-insertion, often 
due to threat of enemy activity. The casualty rate for recon team members grew from 39 
percent to 50 percent per mission between 1967 and 1969. Due to the increased defensive 
posture of the NVA forces protecting the Trail and political restrictions on the U.S. military 
forces, the PAVN supply loss rate dropped from 13.5 percent in 1969 to only 3.4 percent 
in 1970.240 On April 30, 1972 MACVSOG was transferred to the control of the South 
Vietnamese as a result of President Nixon’s Vietnamization strategy effectively marking 
the end of Prairie Fire and American cross border operations.241 
G. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Communications and political authority played a large part in the command and 
control of MACVSOG operations just as it limits or enhances operations today. The recon 
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teams in Laos required communication with the FAC in order to request extraction or to 
call for an airstrike. The communications network from the team across the border reached 
ultimately to the MACV Headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Laos in order to grant the 
authority to commit air or exploitation assets. While obviously required for coordination 
between air and ground assets, the ability of the U.S. Embassy to receive notification within 
minutes and enter the decision cycle could also be argued as a detriment to the recon teams 
in terms of the loss of autonomous authority to receive air support as quickly as possible. 
At the lower levels of military authority, the recon teams were given a wide latitude 
of freedom to innovate and train as they deemed fit. By permitting the recon teams to regard 
experience over rank for command and the ability to train and use equipment in non-
doctrinal ways, they developed more effective tactics in response to their extraordinary 
environment. Risk acceptance by leaders to permit teams to diverge from doctrine during 
training and operations ultimately generated new tactics, techniques, and procedures that 
saved lives and many of which were codified into field manuals following the war. 
H. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 
From the perspective of the recon teams, movement and maneuver were difficult 
and arduous due to the dense jungle environment of the Trail alone. The jungle was a 
double-edged sword. It provided excellent concealment, but it also restricted insertion by 
helicopter. Once the NVA began investing in an early warning network to observe the 
limited number of suitable helicopter landing zones, increased anti-aircraft artillery and 
employed tracker teams, U.S. ability to move and maneuver became restricted. As the 
noose of area denial and active countermeasures increased so did the casualties sustained 
by the recon teams. Limited maneuverability and points from which to launch and land 
U.S. helicopters provided the NVA a defensive advantage that they exploited effectively. 
Despite increased security along the Trail by the forces of North Vietnam, MACVSOG 
was expected to continue operations at its normal pace despite the continuing loss of the 
recon teams’ freedom of maneuver and mounting casualties.  
55 
I. INTELLIGENCE 
The recon teams themselves did not benefit greatly from intelligence assets as they 
were the primary source of intelligence of what was moving on the Trail. Missions that 
resulted in NVA prisoner snatches undoubtedly benefited the recon teams as they were 
able to gain additional insights into the workings of the enemy’s logistical apparatus along 
the Trail. The program code-named Igloo White was supplemental to the recon teams as it 
involved aerial dispersed unattended ground sensors to locate NVA truck and foot traffic. 
The recon teams were occasionally tasked with emplacing these devices as well. The 
intelligence gathered from such devices may have led to recon teams focusing their efforts 
on an area with a large signature, and it certainly directed additional bombing sorties 
against the Trail. However, with the continued operation, the NVA was able to locate such 
devices and learned to manipulate the U.S. analysts into believing targets were present 
when there were none. The vulnerability of unmanned sensors to manipulation and data 
interpretation provides another point of validation for the expected use of ground based 
reconnaissance personnel. 
J. FIRES 
The operations of MACVSOG could not have succeeded without the robust support 
of air to ground fires. When small SOF teams came into contact with numerically superior 
NVA forces, with no friendly ground forces available to respond, they were entirely 
dependent upon airpower for support and extraction. Likewise, airpower alone was unable 
to effectively target NVA assets on the Trail’s network of roads despite the bombing 
capabilities of the U.S. Air Force remaining unchallenged. Vietnam saw the introduction 
of the Spectre gunship platform for fire support that was the innovative fire support 
brainchild of SOG personnel.242 The use of similar platforms continues today as one of 
the most effective forms of fire support available to special operations troops. It should be 
noted, however, that the recon teams were operating against a foe that was unable to 
challenge U.S. airpower aside from anti-aircraft artillery emplaced defensively near the 
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Trail. If there had been contested airspace over Laos, the recon missions would probably 
not have been tenable without developing ground based methods of infiltration and 
extraction. 
K. PROTECTION 
Being a member of OP 35’s Shining Brass-Prairie Fire operation was a hazardous 
assignment. The threat to force was mitigated primarily through the process of selecting 
team leadership based on experience over rank. The Soldiers chosen for MACVSOG were 
already specially selected and trained as Special Forces members. By ensuring only those 
who had previous experience on the ground in Vietnam to lead the teams, the severity of 
the learning curve was diminished. Additionally, the size of the recon teams was kept small 
at twelve men each in order to minimize their physical signature to the NVA. The 
exploitation forces were necessarily larger, but were normally used in limited duration with 
ample pre-planned air support for both their protection and for target prosecution.  
Additionally, the use of indigenous personnel within the recon teams provided a 
protective measure to reduce U.S. casualties as well as capitalize on the local knowledge 
of the populace. By combining and cross training the tactical skills of the Green Berets 
with the local expertise of the indigenous personnel the recon teams were able to conduct 
more missions with fewer Americans and with a higher initial entry level of expertise in 
their operating environment. The use of indigenous personnel helped to fill the capability 
gap that existed within the level of jungle experience the American soldiers had and the 




VI. SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING THE GULF WAR 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, quickly establishing control of the country 
and positioned the Iraqi Army on the border with Saudi Arabia.243 Saddam attacked 
Kuwait with one armored and one mechanized division.244 Simultaneously, heliborne Iraqi 
Special Forces invaded Kuwait City, and Sea Commandos infiltrated the south to cut off 
avenues of approach connecting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.245 Kuwait was under Iraqi 
control in less than 12 hours following the onset of hostilities. The Bush Administration 
understood the power of a multi-national organization and established a robust coalition 
charged with the liberation of Kuwait and containment of further Iraqi incursion. The 
multinational coalition was a strategic technique by the Bush Administration to avoid 
negative perceptions of western countries’ crusade against an Arab state.246 Key to 
maintaining unity within the coalition’s Arab nations was ensuring that Israel did not play 
an active role in the coming operations against Saddam’s Iraq.  
The efforts of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm were the largest military 
operations conducted since World War II.247 The Coalition of military forces assembled 
to combat Iraqi aggression consisted of sea, air, and land forces from numerous countries. 
The synchronization and coordination to support coalition operations tested the U.S. ability 
to cross-cultural, language, and capability gaps. These forces consisted of both 
conventional and unconventional forces. This was the largest deployment of SOF forces to 
a single region in history.248 The employment of SF in support of Operations Desert Shield 
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and Desert Storm provides an opportunity to explore how it was employed in support of a 
high tempo conventional conflict and the challenges that occurred.249 
The geographic combatant command responsible for the region was the United 
States Central Command (CENTCOM). General Schwarzkopf, the CENTCOM 
Commander, became the overall commander for the campaign.250 Of note, “General 
Schwarzkopf was not a great believer in special operations, and his staff made two critical 
decisions on SOF employment.”251 First, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units 
were removed from CENTCOM’s SOF component Special Operations Command Central 
(SOCCENT) and became assets to the theater headquarters.252 Second, SOF were not 
authorized to conduct cross-border operations into Iraq.253 General Schwarzkopf was 
concerned that small elements of SOF “would only get into trouble and he might have to 
divert forces from real war to and bail them out.”254 To ensure these policies were enforced 
strict bureaucratic measures were put into place. No SOF operations could be conducted 
without General Schwarzkopf’s approval and SOF’s representative was a Colonel 
compared to the three-star generals who represented the other services.255 SOCCENT was 
restricted to the following missions to ensure they fit into the conventional fight.  
• Coalition Warfare Support 
• Special Reconnaissance 
• Coordinate Forward Passage of Lines  
• Conduct Combat Search and Rescue 
• Train Kuwaiti Army and Navy Units  
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A. COALITION WARFARE SUPPORT 
The United States Special Operations Command deployed forces to Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, and the King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) to support primarily Saudi Arabian 
and Kuwaiti forces.256 Initially SOCCENT tasked Naval Special Warfare Task Group 
(NSWTG) to provide early warning of Iraqi incursion into Saudi Arabia.257 By September 
1990, 5th Special Forces Group replaced NSWTG to provide early warning, train coalition 
partners, and provide guidance for close air support operations.258 The burden of SOF 
operations consumed all of 5th Special Forces Group and elements of 10th SFG(A) and 3rd 
SFG(A). Special Forces conducted Coalition Warfare support by providing liaison teams 
with partner forces to facilitate coordination and conduct training as required.259 The 
liaisons were very successful and highly sought after to decrease friction during operational 
planning and execution with Allied forces. 
The coalition in support of Operation Desert Shield continued to grow, and so did 
the demand for training and liaisons from Special Forces teams. Initially, SOF were relied 
heavily on to provide training to Kuwaiti military units to rebuild and reestablish their 
capabilities following liberation of Kuwait by the Coalition.260  Special Operations Forces 
were also highly requested to train and support the U.S. Coalition partners. The ability to 
call in close air support was a highly sought after capability SOF had to offer Coalition 
partners. Many of the coalition partners deployed to the Arabian Peninsula requested the 
support of U.S. Special Forces to facilitate close air support.261 The demand required the 
majority of 5th Special Forces Group to meet all of the requests. Special Forces continued 
training coalition forces up until the initiation of the ground war and subsequently 
supported the maneuvering of Kuwaiti forces to liberate Iraqi control areas. The SF 
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personnel found themselves routinely coordinating and synchronizing movements between 
their coalition allies as well as providing navigational and tactical guidance. 
B. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE 
Special Forces were also tasked with conducting special reconnaissance of Iraqi 
forces within the Combined Special Operations Area and facilitate forward passage of 
friendly lines with conventional ground commanders when required.262 In early January 
of 1991, Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFOD-A) 532 from 5th SFG (A) 
was reassigned from training a Saudi mechanized brigade to conduct a special 
reconnaissance mission deep within Iraq to monitor troop movements along a critical 
section of highway.263 With only three weeks to prepare and high altitude aerial 
reconnaissance photos to base their plan on, the team would split into two SR teams and 
conduct helicopter borne insertions and spend up to four days hiding from and surveilling 
Iraqi units.264 Despite the ODA’s best attempts at preparing themselves during the three 
week train-up, the lack of accurate ground level intelligence within the target area 
significantly hampered their chances of success. Upon insertion the helicopter pilot and 
team leader observed numerous Bedouin camps and artillery guns emplaced throughout 
their area of operations that the aerial reconnaissance had completely missed.265 Upon 
landing at the appointed insertion site the members of the SR teams immediately found that 
they were not standing in the Saudi sand dunes that they had practiced digging in, but 
vegetated and hard earthen soil irrigated by the Euphrates flood plain. Unable to dig a hide 
site and surrounded by Bedouins and enemy soldiers, one of the SR teams was quickly 
discovered and evacuated while under attack by a force of 150 Iraqi soldiers.266 The other 
SR team of ODA 532 hid under bushes and was repeatedly unable to make radio contact 
with their higher headquarters. Unfortunately, the team had cached their spare radio and 
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excess equipment at a predetermined site that was now occupied by Bedouin nomads.267 
Additionally, due to sand storms in Saudi Arabia, helicopters were unable to fly the 
predetermined rescue corridor to conduct exfiltration of a team in such circumstances. The 
SR team was unable to communicate their observations of the Iraqi highway and was 
forced to continually hide from passersby with only moderate concealment. Finally, on the 
fourth day a helicopter overflew the team and was able to conduct extraction safely. The 
helicopter pilot had flown the mission only after he had dismissed the misgivings of the 
SOCCENT Commander about the risk of flying for a team that had not communicated and 
was likely dead.268 
C. THE SCUD HUNT 
An additional unexpected mission for SOF arose that could be considered one of 
the most important operations conducted during the ground war.269 SOCCENT was tasked 
to hunt Iraq’s mobile short-range ballistic missiles.270 Saddam Hussein had very few 
options to impose costs upon Coalition forces following their establishment of air 
superiority during the initial airstrikes conducted on January 17, 1991.271 However, 
Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles to threaten neighboring countries, impose costs, and 
attempt to weaken the coalition alliance. Knowing that the U.S. led coalition of Arab states 
would not survive if Israel entered the conflict, Saddam specifically targeted Israeli cities. 
Within the first week of the war, over 30 Scuds were launched into Israel and Saudi 
Arabia.272   
A Scud is the NATO name for a Soviet made short range ballistic missile that the 
Iraqis modified to use in attacks against Coalition forces and Israel.273 The missiles are 37 
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feet tall and can travel about 400 miles in distance placing Coalition forces in Saudi Arabia 
and Israel well within their range.274 The mobile Scud platforms, known in military jargon 
as transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), were extremely challenging to locate and target. 
Despite admittedly spotty intelligence by U.S. agencies, Iraq had an estimated 1,200 
operational missiles.275 The Scuds were not a devastating weapon, but countries could not 
remain idle while missiles caused civilian casualties. Israel continued to threaten to enter 
the war. In the second week of the air war, 26 Scuds were fired on Israel and 27 against 
Saudi Arabia.276 The Scuds were not accurate and did not cause a significant amount of 
damage. Tactically they were ineffective. However, they had a significant psychological 
impact and when used as a weapon of terror they had strategic implications.277 Senior 
leaders were also very concerned the Scud missiles could be outfitted with chemical 
warheads.  
On January 18, 1991, seven Scud missiles impacted within Israel.278 The United 
States’ policymakers became highly concerned that Israel would retaliate and inadvertently 
splinter the Coalition Alliance. Israel’s government and military was required by their own 
policies to take action, however, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
assuaged the Israelis by employing U.S. and British SOF assets to hunt and destroy Scud 
missiles. The Scuds became enough of a concern to U.S. military and policy leaders that 
three squadrons of Coalition aircraft were dedicated to destroying the threat.279 The real 
challenge was locating the mobile TEL Scud firing platforms. The Iraqis pre-surveyed 
firing positions across the thousands of empty square miles of desert, allowing a mobile 
platform to fire missiles and disappear in ten minutes.280 By the time the coalition aircraft 
were in vicinity, the platforms were gone or unable to be observed by the high flying, fast 
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moving jets. The ability to find and attack the mobile TELs from a unilateral air approach 
was so difficult that in 42 instances of actually observing a launcher the pilots were only 
able to engage eight times.281 Despite General Schwarzkopf’s misgivings about the use of 
SOF to do anything “that a Stealth fighter could not,” the inability of an air only campaign 
to score hits against the mobile TELs convinced the civilian and military leadership that 
ground reconnaissance was required.282 
Operating out of Saudi Arabia, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), 
coordinated reconnaissance and surveillance teams comprised of U.S. SF and British SAS 
teams to hunt and destroy Scud infrastructure.283 While the British SAS had begun 
missions within Iraq on 20 January, the first U.S. cross-border operation was conducted on 
February 7, consisting of 16 SOF personnel and two vehicles.284 The Scud hunter elements 
conducted infiltration during hours of limited visibility escorted by armed helicopter 
gunships.285 The teams would dig hide sites and rest all day to lower the risk of 
compromise. The missions were successful, and eventually, the JSOTF provided mission 
command to four Scud hunter elements at a time conducting operations. Due to success of 
their operations, General Schwarzkopf augmented the JSOTF with support from the 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment and a Ranger company.286 The teams conducted 
special reconnaissance providing critical information to facilitate air attacks on identified 
Scud complexes via airstrikes. Often Special Forces teams conducted special 
reconnaissance while Rangers secured the compound and used demolitions to destroy 
critical communication infrastructure of the Scud complexes including microwave 
communications arrays and fiber optic cables.287 Due to the JSOTF’s efforts, the frequency 
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and accuracy of Scud attacks were reduced from an average of 4.7 launches per day during 
the first week of Desert Storm, to only an average of 1.5 Scuds launches for the remaining 
36 days of the conflict. However, there was an increase in Scud launches during the final 
week of the conflict leading analysts to believe that adjustments by Iraqi TEL crews to 
subvert the Scud hunt mission were being recognized and successfully implemented.288  
It is also worth noting that the Scud hunt missions were extremely risky. The British 
SAS teams underestimated the difficulty of maneuvering in the western Iraqi desert during 
periods of darkness. Two SAS teams chose to conduct infiltration without vehicles and 
patrol by foot. One of those teams would immediately turn around having recognized their 
planning error and inability to cover such a vast area, while the other team forged ahead 
and was almost entirely captured or killed by the Iraqi military.289 This SAS team is the 
now infamous Bravo Two Zero, which saw four members captured, three killed, and one 
managing to evade to the Syrian border.290  
The story of Bravo Two Zero shares many similarities with the unsuccessful SR 
mission of ODA 532. The SAS teams had minimal time to prepare for the Scud hunt 
mission. Originally sidelined by General Schwarzkopf’s misgivings about SOF, the SAS 
was fighting for a relevant job and their own piece of the war when Iraq launched Scuds 
into Israel on 18 January. By January 20, the SAS teams were re-directed to hunt for Scud 
missiles and their mobile TEL launchers.291 The British SOF units initially struggled to 
establish effective procedures for working with coalition aircraft to provide terminal attack 
guidance. The only solution available to them was to communicate without encryption 
using emergency rescue frequencies and radio beacons.292 The Brits were also short on 
timely and accurate intelligence. While U.S. teams involved in the Scud hunt were 
provided daily intelligence updates, the SAS teams were only given a general area of 
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probable Scud activity and relied on their own visual reconnaissance.293 Just as the SF 
team leader found Bedouins and anti-aircraft artillery gun emplacements unknown to 
intelligence analysts upon infiltration, so did the SAS members. The men of Bravo Two 
Zero also lacked an understanding of the physical environment they were asserting 
themselves into. Having considered the desert a hot environment and sleeping bags a 
luxury item, they suffered from hypothermia at night.294 Additionally, just as ODA 532 
had misjudged the soil composition, so did the SAS team that had practiced digging in 
southern Saudi Arabia.295 The men of Bravo Two Zero experienced an inability to 
establish communications with their radio system to their higher headquarters during their 
first night on the ground, just as the failed U.S. SF mission had experienced. Fortunate for 
the U.S. Green Berets, they were not compromised by local civilians, however, Bravo Two 
Zero’s location was.296 Following their discovery the SAS soldiers attempted to evade on 
foot through difficult terrain and freezing temperatures. This also led to the team 
abandoning their heavy backpacks which contained their backup radio as well as 
ammunition, food, and water.297 Ultimately, the team became separated and half of the 
group attempted an ill-fated mad dash to the border by hijacking a taxi.298 The ordeal of 
Bravo Two Zero is highlighted as both an example of the extreme physical endurance of 
the SAS men as well as important lessons for the preparation and conduct of high risk 
special reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines. 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Command and control of the SR and Scud hunting missions during the Gulf War 
involved the integration of coalition assets across wide areas of geography to locate Iraqi 
military targets and mobile TEL Scud systems. Initially the bilateral integration between 
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communication systems and coordinated airpower proved difficult but was overcome 
through back up contingency and emergency radio procedures, mainly for the British units 
that had not previously worked with American airpower.299 The individual cases of Bravo 
Two Zero and ODA 532, however, provide an example of what can happen when command 
and control breaks down due to an inability to communicate. These cases, while they are 
the exception, stresses the importance of the lifeline that radio contact represents. The 
necessarily small elements that conduct reconnaissance within enemy territory are at 
constant risk of being compromised and attacked by a superior force. Without the benefit 
of command and control from a higher echelon to provide lifesaving reinforcement or air 
support, such small elements are left to their own devices for survival. The difficulties of 
communicating from within enemy held territory also reinforce the need for commanders 
to permit and acknowledge the autonomy of these teams to execute the intent of the 
operation without constant oversight.  
It is important to note that command and control also encompasses the planning 
timeline and conduct of operations. The reconnaissance teams that found intelligence 
unreliable and planning insufficient may have benefited from additional time to prepare 
and study their geographical areas of operation. The decisions by higher echelon 
commanders that led to truncated planning for such high risk missions carry a share of the 
blame for the misfortunes of the men on the ground. However, hunting for Scud systems 
was of strategic value to the Coalition and international community, making the mission 
appropriate for SF. 
E. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 
Both the American and SAS reconnaissance and Scud hunting patrols inserted into 
their respective areas using helicopters. Just as in Vietnam, the helicopter proved its 
capability to support the rapid infiltration and extraction of reconnaissance teams. Teams 
that understood the terrain and the distances they were required to traverse used specialized 
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off-road vehicles capable of being transported by their helicopters.300 The teams that opted 
instead to maintain a smaller visual and audible signature preferred to remain on foot. 
Given the harsh and vast desert terrain they found themselves in, combined with the 
excessive weight of equipment the teams carried in order to sustain themselves, foot 
movement proved to be extremely difficult. In hindsight, movement by foot while scouring 
the desert for hidden Scud launchers was impractical as the distances covered were 
insufficient to locate the mobile TELs.301 The ability to maneuver across large distances 
rapidly also meant that teams at risk of compromise could also create a degree of separation 
between themselves and their would-be aggressors quickly. In a conflict such as the Gulf 
War where the recon teams enjoyed superiority of air power, this also meant that their 
vehicular movement was safe from aerial interdiction or tracking. 
F. INTELLIGENCE  
The Scud hunting and reconnaissance teams had the benefit of aerial and satellite 
imagery during the planning of their operations. This is, however, limited and was subject 
to the shortfall of being only one source of intelligence that could not alone provide a 
complete picture. The aerial photographs used by both ODA 532 and Bravo Two Zero did 
not clearly indicate the presence of anti-aircraft guns or Bedouin camps. The imagery by 
its overhead nature also made identifying terrain features difficult when the teams were 
planning their hide site locations. A broader approach to intelligence that combines 
multiple sources to create a clearer picture of the battlefield would have benefitted both of 
the teams. Based on the information available it does not appear that either the SAS or the 
U.S. SF team had access to human intelligence such as Bedouin herders, who migrate 
throughout the area, or ex-patriots that would have been able to provide the units with the 
ground truth they were lacking upon infiltration. 
On the other side of the conflict, the Iraqi Scud crews knew their adversary as well 
as their own strengths and weaknesses. The mobile TEL crews were able to thwart 
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intelligence analysts by using their own knowledge of the terrain to mask the launchers 
from aerial reconnaissance. Further, it was learned after the war that the Iraqi military had 
intentionally used their fixed Scud sites as a deception ploy to divert attention away from 
their mobile TEL program.302 
G. FIRES 
The ability of coalition aircraft to penetrate Iraqi airspace and destroy anti-aircraft 
systems and Scud launchers was crucial to the SOF missions within the country. Originally, 
the coalition attempted to rely solely on its attack aircraft to find and destroy Scuds in 
western Iraq. The military leadership, however, soon realized that the ability of the Iraqis 
to hide the mobile TELs and rapidly move after firing made this task incredibly difficult 
for aircraft flying at hundreds of miles per hour. Once SOF teams were employed to locate 
and provide terminal attack guidance for aircraft the success rate of destroying Scud 
launchers increased significantly.303 However,  this success was not without a period of 
trial and error. The British teams originally had no procedure in place for calling in air 
strikes and were forced to use unencrypted emergency channels on survival radios in order 
to orient pilots onto targets.304 Only after the initial attempts to call for fire against 
observed Scud assets did the coalition realize the need to provide liaison elements between 
commands and streamline the process. Even after the procedure was established, the time 
from observing a launcher to the bombs reaching the target took up to 50 minutes.305 
H. SUSTAINMENT 
Sustainment for the reconnaissance patrols was primarily limited to what the team 
members were able to carry on their backs or transport in their vehicles. Aerial resupply 
drops were available if required, however, this would only be conducted in extremis due 
to the potential for compromise. The fewer available British SAS teams, compared to the 
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more numerous U.S. SF teams, resulted in longer duration operations and heavier loads for 
the SAS to sustain themselves and cover an area of comparable size.306 The teams that 
opted for vehicular transportation enjoyed the ability to remain on ground longer as they 
were able to carry far more supplies. Both Bravo Two Zero and ODA 532 brought extra 
equipment, including spare radios, in order to prepare for potential contingencies. 
However, in both cases those spare radios and backup equipment was lost due to either a 
cache site becoming inaccessible or due to dropping the burdensome gear in favor of a 
greater degree of maneuverability. 
I. PROTECTION  
Protection of the SOF teams operating within Iraq was multifaceted. The teams 
deployed with as few personnel as possible and moved primarily at night to maintain a 
smaller detectable signature while avoiding civilians.307 Radio communications were kept 
to specific and brief windows of time in an attempt to prevent detection by Iraqi forces 
employing radio frequency triangulation systems. Planning for the environment was 
perhaps the most crucial protective measure, and the one that failed Bravo Two Zero. 
Teams that accurately predicted their maneuverability and sustainment requirements faired 
far better and were able to adapt to their combat environment. 
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VII. ANALYSIS 
We researched four cases to illuminate themes of success and failure at select points 
in the history of U.S. special operations. Our objective was to determine best practices that 
might apply to USASOC in the future operational environment of MDO. The four case 
studies provide historical vignettes in which special operations forces were called upon to 
conduct operations in what would now be known as the deep maneuver and operational 
deep fires areas within MDO. Each case displayed that airpower alone was insufficient to 
answer high priority intelligence requirements and destroy high priority targets to meet 
operational objectives.  
By observing history, it can be assumed that SF will be required to conduct ground 
based actions in the future operating environment. At the conclusion of historical analysis, 
ten common themes were illuminated across the historical cases. These themes are 
categorized into the applicable warfighting functions (see Figure 3). Some themes were 
found to be pertinent under multiple warfighting functions due to a range of implications 
and are repeated as applicable. 
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Figure 3. Findings 
In WWII, the Norsk Hydro Heavy-Water plant was a strategic target that the Allies 
targeted to delay the Germans from obtaining a nuclear bomb. The target resided in German 
controlled territory in a particularly austere location that encountered harsh winters. It was 
infeasible for a conventional company or battalion sized element to conduct a raid. The 
plant was also extremely well-fortified, making it highly resistant to Allied bombing raids. 
Therefore, it was necessary to use special operations teams to gather intelligence and 
conduct sabotage operations to degrade the plant’s heavy water production. Similarly, the 
OSS partnered with the French resistance to increase the effectiveness of air bombardment 
operations. The Jedburgh teams on the ground leveraged host nation resistance forces and 
the local population to locate high priority targets for the allied air campaign as well as 
gather key intelligence and conduct sabotage against the German infrastructure and 
fortifications that opposed the D-Day landing sites.  
In Vietnam, special operations recon teams were inserted via helicopter across the 
border, where they moved undetected to a designated area to conduct a variety of 
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. Green Berets were specifically used in Laos due to 
the covert nature of the operation, political risk and the extreme danger requiring specially 
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trained personnel. The missions were arguably a conventional application of special 
operations forces, as the targets were tactical in nature. Once the recon teams located 
PAVN forces, they contacted a forward air controller (FAC) flying overhead to request and 
direct air sorties against the targets.308 The exploitation forces located and reported targets 
for airstrikes in addition to providing a battle damage assessment of the initial airstrikes. 
The use of indigenous personnel to augment the recon teams and exploitation forces 
decreased U.S. casualties and increased capability, in line with the unconventional warfare 
doctrine of the Special Forces.  
In Desert Storm, the inability of the air campaign to successfully target the mobile 
TELs convinced much of the civilian and military leadership that ground reconnaissance 
was required.309 The TELs were highly maneuverable and extremely difficult to identify 
with air assets alone. Operating out of Saudi Arabia, the Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (JSOTF), coordinated reconnaissance and surveillance teams comprised of unilateral 
U.S SOF and British SAS teams to hunt and destroy Scud infrastructure.310 The teams 
conducted special reconnaissance providing critical information to facilitate air strikes on 
identified Scud complexes. It is worth noting that in Desert Storm while the coalition had 
achieved air supremacy, ground reconnaissance assets were still required. In the contested 
airspace of the MDO concept the inability of high value aircraft to loiter while searching 
for targets of commensurate value will likely require ground based confirmation prior to 
an attempted strike. 
Throughout history ground reconnaissance has proven essential when aerial assets 
alone are unable to achieve mission requirements. In an MDO environment the adversary 
is anticipated to conduct area denial through layered systems of long range weapons in all 
domains of warfare. It is also assumed that in an MDO environment the airspace will be 
highly contested or denied.311 Therefore, as history has shown us, it is reasonable to 
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assume Special Forces teams will continue to be critical for a variety of reconnaissance, 
surveillance, sabotage, and direct action missions in the deep maneuver and operational 
deep fires areas to achieve operational and strategic effects.  
To suggest the best practices of employing ARSOF teams within adversarial 
territory this study binned the common observations from each historical case into the six 
Warfighting Functions. The following themes emerged from analysis of the four cases. 
Some themes were assessed to be applicable across multiple Warfighting Functions.  
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. Appropriate Application of SF 
Special Forces are capable of operating at each level of warfare: tactical, 
operational, and strategic. However, SF teams are highly skilled units that are not able to 
be reconstituted easily or quickly; they should be applied against objectives that are 
commensurate to the risks and criticality of an operation.312 Doctrinally SF conducts SR 
against only operational or strategic level objectives that are beyond the capability of 
conventional reconnaissance assets.313 To utilize SF teams against tactical level objectives 
that are within the capability of conventional assets should be avoided whenever possible. 
The employment of SF teams to perform tactical reconnaissance for conventional units 
places these assets at risk and displaces their specialized ability as a combat multiplier 
elsewhere on the battlefield. Vietnam observed a high casualty rate of Green Berets due to 
repeatedly using special operations troops against tactical level objectives.314 In the MDO 
environment SF will continue to be a finite resource that should be applied judiciously. 
Therefore, the application of ODAs against tactical level objectives is a suboptimal use of 
assets. The use of SF teams against operational to strategic level targets permits a more 
efficient allocation of theater assets to support the mission. Focusing the planning of 
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intelligence and available fires assets to support a team throughout planning to extraction 
ensures a higher chance of operational success. 
2. Assumed Risk and Freedom of Innovation 
Assumption of risk and innovation are tied to one another within the rote doctrine 
confines of the military. In order for innovation to occur within an organization defined by 
discipline, commanders need to accept the risk of failure that is possible when subordinates 
attempt to implement new tactics, techniques, or procedures. Innovative ideas that may 
provide an edge in combat can be stifled by a leader unwilling to allow variations from the 
normal operating procedures. Throughout the historical cases common successful themes 
of risk acceptance by commanders and the ability to innovate solutions emerged. 
Commanders not only had to accept the higher level of risk to force commensurate with 
deep area operations, they needed to permit small unit leaders a high degree of autonomy 
during training for such missions. The high risk nature of a small element operating within 
proximity to large adversarial forces and the need to maintain a minimal electromagnetic 
spectrum signature required the SR teams to make and alter decisions on the ground in real 
time without authorization from higher. In the training environment, SR teams that were 
permitted to experiment outside of standardized tactics, techniques, procedures, and 
doctrine were better able to adapt to their operating environment and the enemy.  
Recon teams in Vietnam were provided a wide latitude to determine what 
equipment they carried and how to train and use explosives and firearms. British SAS 
“patrol members have a tradition of great operational autonomy” and were afforded the 
opportunity to innovate solutions to enable maneuver in the desert environment.315 Some 
SAS teams opted to use specially modified Land Rovers and were more efficient than those 
that chose to patrol on foot.316 The freedom to experiment was crucial to finding new 
solutions to tactical problems that ultimately reduced risk and increased efficiency. 
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In the MDO operating environment an electromagnetic signature is expected to 
draw the attention of adversarial defensive measures. SF teams should expect to have 
limited communications capabilities with their higher headquarters and vice versa. Teams 
operating within this non-permissive environment will be required to act upon their 
commander’s intent more heavily and rely less on direct control. With communications 
and direct support limited by the effects of electromagnetic signals interception and 
contested airspace, leaders will need to provide their soldiers the freedom to innovate and 
assume risk during training that reflect this anticipated reality. 
B. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 
1. Specialized Skills and/or Experience 
To remain undetected in hostile territory and to be able to retain a degree of freedom 
of movement often requires special skills unique to the geography, environment, and or 
culture of the location. In each historical case the success or failure of a mission was often 
the result of the team’s ability to move when necessary and to blend into their surroundings 
while stationary. During Operation Gunnerside the skills required were technical in nature, 
such as cross country skiing, mountaineering or airborne infiltration. For the OSS, it was 
their ability to blend in and move within the local population to remain undetected and 
operational. The soldiers of MACVSOG relied upon the jungle warfare experience of 
senior members that had previously fought within Vietnam as well as the inherent 
knowledge of the indigenous personnel within their teams. During the Gulf War there was 
little to no prior experience operating within the Iraqi desert for either the British SAS or 
the U.S. SF teams and a loss of efficiency occurred. Personnel with experience in a specific 
geographic area, were observed to be especially beneficial as they provided an additional 
knowledge base of what may be normal within the area and how to move from one point 
to another without arousing suspicion or drawing attention.  
Generally, during SR missions the personnel needed to move from an insertion 
point to an observation point and then conduct extraction upon conclusion of the operation. 
Each movement is extremely deliberate and represents the greatest chance of compromise. 
To reduce the risk of discovery, specialized infiltration methods are used to enable SF to 
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conduct operations where the adversary does not expect due to austere environments, harsh 
terrain, or enemy disposition. Modern Army SF companies maintain dive, airborne, 
military freefall, and mountaineering skills as specialty infiltration techniques.  
In an MDO environment, the ability for a team to move undetected will be 
paramount for any mission within the Deep Maneuver or Operational Deep Fires Areas. 
Advances in surveillance technology will make the task of remaining undetected more 
difficult. Therefore, any specialty skill that aids in the effort of arriving to an objective 
undetected should be emphasized in training. The ability to move undetected within the 
physical or human terrain of an operational area depends on the specialized skills of the 
SOF soldiers and requires extensive training prior to its high stakes application. 
2. Economy of Force/Small Elements 
Smaller and lower cost assets such as SFOD-A’s provide a combat multiplier effect 
that allows the force to employ significantly less logistical resources to obtain a higher 
payoff of operational/strategic value than by employing a larger scale conventional unit. 
During the Gulf War SR teams more effective and cost efficient than the initial air 
campaign to find and destroy Iraq’s mobile TEL Scud systems.317 Additionally, by 
maintaining smaller logistical footprint, SOF teams retained a greater freedom of 
maneuverability within a denied or contested area. The initial plan for Operation Freshman 
used a much larger ground force and saw the loss of one Halifax bomber, two gilders and 
their entire compliment of commandos. The resulting Operation Gunnerside destroyed the 
heavy water electrolysis chambers at the hydro plant using only ten personnel. Considering 
the long range of an adversaries anticipated layered standoff weapon systems across all 
domains within the MDO concept, it is assumed that large static units and logistical trains 
will be priority targets for kinetic and cyber weapons. Smaller and more mobile formations, 
such as SF, will continue to offer a high reward / low cost option for commanders to employ 
against the adversary with a minimal risk to logistical assets.  
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3. Environmental Considerations 
The environment of the area of operations defines the SR mission. The terrain and 
environment of an area determines what mobility equipment is required as well as range of 
observation for both friend and foe. In the cases, successful operations within denied 
territory effectively accounted for the local terrain and environment into their planning and 
operations. Unsuccessful missions often failed to compensate for factors such as weather 
conditions specific to the region or inaccurately assumed what the soil composition would 
be. Recon teams in Vietnam would be entirely unable to operate if dropped in the desert of 
Western Iraq and vice versa. Within the future operating environment this maxim is not 
likely to change. Teams that fail to fully understand their operating environment may not 
be capable of covering the terrain necessary to locate their target, take advantage of a 
tactical situation, or they may be unable to withdraw to avoid capture. Immobile teams 
provide little more benefit than an emplaced static sensor could provide. 
C. INTELLIGENCE 
1. Use of Indigenous Personnel 
The use of indigenous personnel for their local knowledge provides many obvious 
benefits to a military force. From an intelligence perspective these same personnel may be 
able to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of a target with a lower likelihood of 
compromise and lower risk to SOF personnel. While examples such as the Leaping Lena 
operation of Vietnam discount their usefulness as a unilateral force, MACVSOG recon 
teams effectively incorporated indigenous personnel into intelligence collection operations 
by conducting combined training and operations. In Operation Gunnerside the commandos 
used in the raid were indigenous personnel themselves. 
In WWII, the OSS routinely used local personnel to collect information on German 
patrols and operations. When used in concert with trained SOF personnel to direct and 
support their training and implementation indigenous personnel are capable of performing 
some of the tasks that would normally require a ground reconnaissance team. In each case 
study, successful operations within denied areas involved actively participating indigenous 
personnel or the use of intelligence gathered by the local population during the planning 
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process. When local knowledge was not available, such as scud hunting in the Gulf War, 
SF teams failed to identify critical issues during the planning process and made poor 
decisions during the operation due to lack of local knowledge.  
Within the MDO environment indigenous personnel present a backdoor option for 
special operations within the deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas of the 
adversary’s territory when feasible. While it is assumed that civilian populations will 
continue to exist within the geographical areas protected by an adversaries layer standoff 
weapon systems, those personnel will have an understanding of the pattern of life and 
normal operating procedures of the enemy within their purview. The use of indigenous 
personnel will continue to be a potentially highly valued source of experience and 
knowledge to bolster the effectiveness of operations within a non-permissive area and 
should be leveraged whenever possible. When feasible ARSOF assets should conduct 
operations combined with indigenous personnel to situational awareness increase 
intelligence collection and a myriad of other benefits to include risk mitigation. 
2. Multi-source Intelligence for Planning Purposes 
A single point of failure in military planning is not desirable. A plan that is derived 
from a single source of intelligence is likewise subject to the limitations, analytical flaws, 
and potential deception of that one and only piece of information. Ideally, planning is 
conducted using numerous sources of intelligence that create the most detailed picture 
possible while simultaneously highlighting outliers of data.  
Within the cases studied, preparations to operate in denied areas that relied upon a 
single source or type of intelligence were at a marked disadvantage to those that used 
multiple sources. The Gulf War SR missions relied purely on high altitude aerial 
photography due to Iraq’s robust anti-aircraft defense network. Similar to the results of the 
aerial reconnaissance conducted for the Scud Hunt, these photos were of limited value as 
they missed numerous Iraqi defenses and could not anticipate the movements of the local 
Bedouins. The result was that teams inserted into suboptimal areas and increased their risk 
of compromise or resulted in the immediate need for extraction.  
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During Vietnam the triple canopy jungle significantly limited the capabilities of 
aerial reconnaissance. The CIA attempted to resolve this issue by employing local 
personnel to act as road watchers along the Ho Chi Minh trail. However, the road watchers 
proved to be ineffective due to lack of training and oversight. MACVSOG recon teams 
effectively incorporated indigenous personnel into intelligence collection operations by 
conducting combined training and operations. As MACVSOG continued to conduct 
operations across the borders of Laos and Cambodia they found additional success in the 
convergence of intelligence gained from available local national personnel, pre-mission 
aerial reconnaissance flights, captured enemy soldiers, and radio signals emitted by the 
NVA. By combining numerous sources of intelligence to paint a more accurate picture of 
the target, SF teams were able to be employed more efficiently. The use of multiple types 
of intelligence also served to protect friendly forces against the enemy’s counter-
intelligence activities.  
In the anticipated future MDO environment adversarial deception operations are 
expected to be commonplace as an additive measure to area denial weapon systems. It will 
be paramount to arm future ARSOF assets in the deep maneuver space with the best 
possible convergence of intelligence sources to limit the effectiveness of these 
countermeasures while simultaneously providing them with the greatest ground truth 
before deploying. Hastening the deployment of assets into the Deep Maneuver or 
Operational Deep Fires Areas of MDO without a clear understanding of the intelligence 
available would likely prove to be a fatal error. 
D. SUSTAINMENT: NON-STANDARD LOGISTICS 
As previously noted within the Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function’s 
Economy of Force principle, SOF operations are conducted with a limited logistical 
support due to the risk of compromise by a resupply operation. Sustainment efforts for SF 
teams conducting deep maneuver operations are understandably limited and often are 
comprised entirely of what the soldiers are able to carry upon insertion. 
During Operation Gunnerside the Norwegian commandos hunted and foraged for 
food while remaining hidden from the occupying German forces. The recon teams of 
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MACVSOG in Vietnam carried only what would be absolutely necessary to remain as light 
and mobile as possible which directly effects the length of time they were able to remain 
within an area of operations. Both U.S. SF and British SAS employed resupply caches 
during the Gulf War. However, in two extreme instances those caches were unable to be 
recovered due to enemy or local populous movements. Other U.S. and British teams 
adapted by using vehicles to carry additional supplies and increase the duration they were 
able to remain on ground. In the selected cases, the duration of missions for soldiers within 
a deep maneuver area were tied to the air support available to them. During WWII the OSS 
and Norwegian commandos experienced heavily contested airspace, and as a result their 
operations tended to last longer in duration to capitalize as much as possible following a 
successful infiltration. During Vietnam and the Gulf War, air superiority was attained and 
therefore missions tended to be shorter in duration but higher in frequency. The advent of 
rotary wing infiltration methods enabled more frequent infiltration and exfiltration in and 
out of operational areas thus decreasing the duration forces were required to stay in the 
area of operation.  
Within the MDO environment, due to the anticipated contested airspace, it is 
assumed that SF teams will be required to conduct operations longer in duration and 
without the expectation of resupply. Teams will be limited in operation duration based on 
the supplies they are able to carry, or their ability to sustain themselves using the local 
environment whether rural or urban in nature. Emergency resupply operations or frequent 
rotations of teams in and out of non-permissive areas is likely difficult to impossible within 
the expected MDO environment. 
E. PROTECTION  
1. Use of Indigenous Personnel 
Unilateral military action is preferred from an operational security and counter-
intelligence perspective, however, the knowledge that local national personnel are able to 
contribute to operations conducted within denied areas have proven beneficial. When 
feasible, indigenous personnel should be utilized for operations within denied areas to 
provide the best possible protective measures in the form of local geographical knowledge 
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and customs. The SOF commandos in Operation Gunnerside were chosen because they 
were native to their area of operations. Therefore, they possessed a detailed understanding 
of the climate, terrain and population centers enabling them to maneuver within the area to 
avoid detection and evade German patrols. The OSS operatives that coordinated resistance 
activities within France prior to the D-Day landings relied upon members of the French 
Resistance to move throughout urban areas and to hide them from the German occupying 
forces. The Jedburgh teams were able to successful survive in the urban populations by 
conducting operations with an indigenous partner force and highly trained individuals on 
their teams who were from the local area. The Jedburgh teams were also trained in language 
and culture skills specific to their area of operation.  
In Vietnam, the MACVSOG recon teams were comprised of nine indigenous 
personnel and three American Green Berets. This permitted the Green Berets to capitalize 
on the inherent local knowledge of the jungle while bolstering the teams’ firepower and 
reducing American casualties once their partnered personnel were fully trained. However, 
during the Gulf War all SR and Scud Hunt operations were conducted unilaterally, without 
the use of indigenous personnel. This was primarily due to the short time frame of 
notification to infiltration and there was no opportunity to train cohesive teams with 
expatriated Iraqis, Kurds, or other personnel local to the area. Specifically, Bravo Two Zero 
SAS patrol infilled into the area of operations without basic area knowledge, no indigenous 
personnel, and they lacked an interpreter. Their lack of basic understanding of local 
customs, and unawareness of best practices for mobility in the region during the winter 
months led to their unsuccessful operation.  
Within the MDO concept the use of resistance groups or sympathetic segments of 
the population remains valuable and couples the SF core tasks of unconventional warfare 
with SR and DA missions conducted within the deep areas. Similar to the value indigenous 
personnel provide to movement and maneuver, their knowledge and potential support are 
also an inherently protective measure for SF teams operating within their home territory. 
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2. Frequency and Duration of Operations 
Repetition of a task breeds familiarity and expertise. The same is true for repetitive 
military operations within a defined geographical area, as more missions are conducted the 
soldiers involved develop a greater understanding of the terrain and improve upon tactical 
operating procedures. Over time the OSS operatives and the SOG recon teams were able 
to improve from a basic level of training and gain a higher degree of efficiency within their 
respective operations. However, the longer operations are persistently conducted within a 
denied area the risk to force greatly increases. Once an adversary is aware of SR operations 
and their operational or strategic impact is felt, countermeasures to such operations begin 
to appear. If operations continue to be conducted over a long enough time frame their level 
of efficiency drops as the enemy reacts accordingly.  
The duration of operations is a delicate balance between effectiveness and 
protecting the force. In WWII, the OSS did not infiltrate into the area of operation until 
late as possible prior to the invasion of D-Day. They were not infilled sooner due to the 
fear of compromise. If they were infilled slightly earlier, they may have had an even greater 
operational impact. However, during Vietnam the recon teams lost their freedom to 
maneuver and experienced an increase in casualties over time due to the frequency and 
duration of their repeated operations. As the NVA became aware of MACVSOG 
reconnaissance teams they deployed tracking teams, helicopter landing zone watchers, and 
specialized quick reaction forces which greatly reduced the effectiveness of MACVSOG.  
The frequency, duration and threshold of violence of persistent operations must be 
continually assessed in order to protect the force. This appears as a universal theme and 
will likely be inherent to the MDO concept as an adversary reacts and prioritizes threats 
that meet an undefined but expected threshold of violence. Evolving technologies within 
the MDO environment that combine SF team actions with other domains such as cyber 
may cause unintentional shifts to the threshold and elicit responses from an adversary that 
will need to be anticipated to protect the soldiers supporting such activities from within the 
deep areas. 
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3. Specialized Skills and/or Experience 
As discussed under movement and maneuver, specialized skills or local area 
experience are required for a team to remain undetected while being able to maintain 
mobility. The specialized skills required for various methods of infiltration and exfiltration 
are also a protective measure in that they reduce the possibility of compromise through 
maneuvering by methods or within areas that the adversary does not consider likely or 
possible. During Operation Gunnerside, the Norwegian commandos were able to approach 
their target without opposition due to their ability exist in the harsh Norwegian winter and 
cross terrain that the German security personnel did not consider possible.  
The ability to cross denied terrain unobserved is a requirement for both mobility 
and survivability. The MDO environment is characterized by layered weapon systems 
across multiple domains to create a larger degree of standoff between U.S. and adversarial 
forces. The detection capabilities and nature of these evolving networks of weapon systems 
will likely have a direct impact on protective measures SF teams will be required to 
implement to avoid compromise during all phases of operations within the deep areas. 
Specialized individual skills that allow SF soldiers to penetrate the area of standoff through 
avenues of approach deemed unlikely by the adversary will continue to bolster operational 
effectiveness. 
4. Economy of Force/Small Elements 
A common theme among successful SOF operations within denied areas is the use 
of the fewest personnel possible to complete the mission to maintain a small physical 
signature to lower the chance of compromise. SOF teams conducting SR or sabotaging 
enemy assets used 12 personnel or fewer across each case studied. Often the 12-man team 
was broken down into two smaller elements to facilitate the requirements of an operation. 
This permitted the team to maneuver as covertly as possible within the environment with 
the lowest risk of compromise. While small elements are at a firepower disadvantage if 
confronted by a larger adversarial force, they provide a high cost to benefit ratio when 
compared to forcible entry of a larger conventional unit. The protection of SOF teams 
operating deep within an enemy area is primarily in their ability to avoid confrontation in 
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the first place through remaining uncompromised. In the anticipated MDO environment 
the small physical size of teams will likely continue to be favored, especially as 
technological detection measures increase. 
5. Environmental Considerations 
Closely tied to movement and maneuver, characteristics of the environment within 
the area of operations provides a degree of protection for SOF operations if taken advantage 
of. During Operation Gunnerside, the harsh winter alpine environment permitted the 
Grouse team to evade German patrols and hide deep within the mountains until 
reinforcements could be provided. This was successful due to the ability and willingness 
of the team to conduct operations where the enemy was not able or willing. The OSS 
operatives were able to hide within the rural countryside masked by harsh winter weather 
to avoid capture. The dense jungles of Vietnam allowed recon teams to hide along the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail and at times snatch prisoners or valuable intelligence documents before 
quickly blending back into the vegetation and extracting. Conversely, the SOF teams 
observed in this study during the Gulf War lacked a complete understanding of the desert 
and were forced to improvise hide sites when they were unable to dig into the rocky soil. 
The SAS teams participating in the Scud Hunt quickly discovered that mobility within the 
desert required not only specialized vehicles, but navigational and operational skills 
necessary to cover any substantial distance to either locate a target or to avoid being 
compromised.  
Teams that understand the environment and use it to their advantage are much more 
likely to succeed than those who do not. In the MDO environment this observation remains 
but may be expanded as the adversaries’ capabilities are expected to include space and 
cyberspace capabilities. Special Forces teams operating within the MDO deep areas will 
need to account for the expansion of the environment to include these added domains and 
the risks their systems present to the soldier on the ground. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
In this study we have attempted to address a perceived gap between the 
requirements for Special Forces in the MDO concept and the current capabilities that the 
force has focused on for the previous two decades during the Global War on Terror. The 
focus of this research centered on SF team operations as a part of the Joint Force in the 
deep maneuver and deep operational fires areas of the MDO environment. Throughout the 
historical research, this study found that in all four cases military commanders first 
attempted to use airpower unilaterally to destroy an enemy capability or target. In every 
case, airpower alone failed to achieve the desired results and ground based special 
operations assets were required to either provide terminal targeting information for air 
strikes or to destroy the target through direct action. Observing that airpower alone was 
repeatedly insufficient and that the MDO environment anticipates the U.S. military will 
face contested or denied airspace, this study suggests that SF teams will again be called 
upon to conduct ground based operations within non-permissive areas. 
Through analysis of four selected historical case studies we were able to identify 
common observations of SOF operations in the non-permissive environments of their 
individual conflicts. By categorizing the observations into the Army’s warfighting 
functions we coalesced our findings into common themes applicable to assessing combat 
power in a doctrinal manner (see Figure 4). The implications of these observations to the 
future operating environment of MDO were then applied using selected elements of the 
Joint Staff’s capabilities development system, specifically the aspects of doctrine and 
training to create recommendations for future changes to the force. 
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Figure 4. Recommendations 
B. TRAINING 
1. Specialty Infiltration Skills  
Specialized skills, such as infiltration methods, were identified as valuable 
capabilities within both the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions. 
The ability to infiltrate into an area using a specialized skillset creates options for 
approaching an objective from a direction the adversary may not anticipate, therefore 
decreasing the possibility of detection. Special Forces companies organize teams based on 
specialty infiltration methods to include military mountaineering, military freefall, and 
underwater dive operations respectively. As seen in operations conducted in WWII, 
Vietnam and Desert Storm specialty infiltration and exfiltration methods enabled SOF to 
gain access to denied environments and traverse rugged terrain. The layered standoff 
weapon systems, anti-aircraft aerial denial anticipated to be confronted within the MDO 
FOE will require innovative infiltration methods. Skillsets such as under water operations 
and military freefall have not been used frequently in the Global War on Terror, but may 
become applicable again in the MDO environment. Special Forces should continue to 
maintain specialty methods of infiltration to be prepared for a conflict with a peer adversary 
in the future.  
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2. Create a Dedicated SOF Training Course for SR 
As seen throughout the historical case studies SOF was called upon to conduct SR 
in order to fill a gap in the conventional militaries targeting capabilities. Special 
reconnaissance is a specialty skill that requires continues deliberate training. It is not a 
skillset that can be produced hastily following a crisis. The tactics, techniques and 
procedure to conduct SR is highly dependent upon the operational environment in which 
it is conducted. As seen in the historical cases each operational environment required local 
knowledge, adaptation, and detailed planning to avoid detection, conduct non-standard 
sustainment and maintain mobility. The individual environments, whether the tundra, 
desert, jungle or urban, required unique training of pertinent skillsets. 
As history has shown, Special Forces will be called upon in the future to conduct 
SR to conduct intelligence collection and enable joint targeting. The increasingly lethal, 
complex, and denied environment of MDO will require multi-source intelligence collection 
including ground based reconnaissance. Currently there is no SOF specific SR training 
course and the skill set as atrophied over time. United States Army Special Operations 
Command maintains the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course which offers many 
training aspects of SR, however, it is a long range marksmanship, or sniper, course 
primarily with a SR focus as a secondary function to support the first. The conventional 
Army offers the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) which is 
focused on specialty reconnaissance tasks, but it is not SOF specific and is taught to 
accommodate tactical level reconnaissance using conventional Army systems and SOPs.  
During Vietnam, MACVSOG established reconnaissance and leadership training 
courses in theater to help prepare soldiers for the cross-border operations after it became 
apparent that home station training did not offer the variety of specialized skills required. 
A specialized course that uses the most current equipment available within SOCOM, the 
variety of specialized infiltration means, and the use of indigenous personnel to prepare SR 
teams for missions within the future operating environment of the MDO concept would 
bolster operational effectiveness. A dedicated training course that emphasizes such 
operational principles as suggested in this study would increase the effectiveness of SR 
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teams early in a conflict due to a reduction of risk and higher initial reconnaissance 
experience. 
3. Conduct Training in Limited Communication Environment 
Within the cases studied, SOF was required to conduct operations in an 
environment that restricted the method and frequency of communications between the 
teams and their respective higher headquarters. The small elements had to minimize their 
electromagnetic spectrum signature to avoid being triangulated by adversarial tracking 
elements. This required senior leaders to assume risk and adapt their leadership style to 
rely more on commander’s guidance and mission intent to compensate for a lack of direct 
control. Junior leaders were required to operate with a higher level of autonomy, adapt, and 
innovate to overcome unforeseen challenges within the environment.  
In the MDO environment SF teams should expect to experience similar conditions. 
Training in preparation of operations within the MDO FOE should reflect these anticipated 
environment. Senior leaders will have to become comfortable with a lack of direct control 
that has become expected in the recent Global War on Terror. Junior leaders will need to 
develop the skills and confidence to adapt to the operational environment with minimum 
guidance from higher command. At the lowest level, communications specialists, need to 
hone in the skills necessary to establish communications while maintaining a low signature.  
4. Re-emphasize Regional Alignment 
The success or failure of special operations often was determined by how well the 
units accounted for the operational environment. There are many conditions specific to a 
particular region that requires team to compensate for or adapt. Often these conditions are 
learned through experiences, detailed planning and local knowledge. The use of indigenous 
personnel was effective in Operation Gunnerside and operations conducted by the OSS. 
However, the lack of local knowledge and inability to incorporate indigenous personnel 
into the planning of SR in support of Desert Storm resulted in catastrophic consequences.  
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Special Forces are regionally aligned to increase their cultural and geographical 
knowledge base while maintaining relationships with indigenous forces. However, due to 
the operational demand of the Global War on Terror, many groups have continuously 
deployed outside of their assigned area of responsibility. The repeated deployments to Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Syria may have atrophied the overall knowledge of specific areas. Special 
Forces should re-emphasize regional alignment, culture and language skills to enable 
planning and future operations. Within the MDO concept the physical environment and 
human terrain will continue to be an integral part of the battlespace as it has been observed 
throughout the historical case studies. Collective training events, particularly with host 
nation partner forces, provide opportunities for SF soldiers to refine language skills, 
cultural awareness, geographical knowledge, and local population sentiment towards U.S. 
goals and objectives. As the military shifts its focus from counter-terrorism towards global 
peer competitors, SF will need to reestablish respective regional expertise in preparation 
for unknown future conflicts.  
5. Emphasize Non-standard Sustainment Training 
In every historical case considered re-supply efforts were limited due to either 
contested airspace or the risk that it posed to identifying the ground team’s location, or 
both. The team members were required to carry the prerequisite supplies and equipment to 
sustain themselves throughout the duration of their mission or to procure what they needed 
from the environment. While there is ongoing efforts within the force to lighten the load 
of the individual soldier, longer duration missions may require personnel to resupply 
themselves with what they can obtain on the future battlefield. For SF soldiers in the deep 
areas of MDO, this will require re-learning lost skills of conducting non-standard 
sustainment through the local environment or economy instead of relying upon aerial 
resupply based out of large forward operating bases. For teams operating within harsh 
environments this may require specific knowledge of survival to extend the duration of 
their mission. These skills should be introduced in the training environment well in advance 
in order to build the individual soldier’s knowledge base and to foster creative thinking that 
results from necessity when normal methods of sustainment are unavailable.  
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C. DOCTRINE: “STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE” 
Special Reconnaissance as it currently exists as a SF core task is doctrinally 
conducted against targets at the operational and strategic levels of war. However, as it was 
observed following the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and General Schwarzkopf’s initial 
guidance during the Gulf War, conventional military leaders are apt to utilize SF teams to 
conduct reconnaissance at the tactical level if they are provided the opportunity. Utilizing 
SF teams in high risk reconnaissance missions against tactical objectives presents a 
dangerous precedent for overuse and represents a misallocation of combat power. 
Conventional Army units maintain reconnaissance units such as Infantry Scout Platoons 
and Cavalry Scout Troops to conduct this role. If SF leadership permit their units to be 
continually utilized in a tactical reconnaissance role they are risking an operational to 
strategic asset for limited gain and preventing that team from conducting or preparing for 
other core tasks of greater value. By changing the term to Strategic Reconnaissance there 
would be an acknowledged emphasis placed on the value of the reconnaissance target and 
an initial step towards shared understanding of reconnaissance roles within the Joint Force.  
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The most probable course of action for the U.S. is the continued proxy wars and 
challenges seen within the competition phase prior to open hostilities with a near-peer 
adversary. There is no doubt U.S. Special Forces will continue to play a vital role within 
the competition space to progress the nation’s foreign policy objectives. However, our 
research sought to initiate the first steps in preparation of a high risk scenario that may 
result in the U.S. engaged in high intensity conflict with a peer competitor. Lessons derived 
from history may inform adaptations required for SF to prepare for operations conducted 
in the deep maneuver and operational deep fires areas of the MDO future environment. 
Each selected case study displayed that air power alone was insufficient to achieve U.S. 
objectives. As in the past, special operations will be called upon again to fill gaps in 
conventional military capabilities by conducting operations beyond the line of friendly 
troops. The success and failures of special operations conducted in the past illuminated 
themes that may lead to the success of special operations within MDO. Commanders at 
93 
higher echelons within the special forces community will need to balance the required 
training challenges of the MDO concept with the more likely reality of continuing to deploy 
around the globe in support of U.S. efforts within the competition space and in conflict 
with non-state actors. Suggestions as represented in this study that offer preparations to 
conflict within MDO should be weighted appropriately between current expectations of the 
force and the possibility of the worst case scenario of conflict with a peer state. 
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